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What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual
Property and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication
I. Introduction
Individuals have long had the desire but little ability to control the
dissemination of personal information about their health. Law has been a weak
instrument for such control, given the articulate and powerful interests that insist
upon maintaining and enhancing access and use of others' personal information,
with sensitive medical data proving only a sporadic exception.  Technology has
so far only made exploitation of personal information easier.  The evolving
federal framework for the protection of electronic medical records is, at the
moment, one in which individuals are third-party beneficiaries of what are likely to
be flexibly-interpreted, ponderously-enforced fair information practices created in
the shadow of a Congressionally-mandated networking of sensitive medical data.
This networking promises to greatly lower the costs of accessing and using
medical data for any number of purposes—including ones not central to health
care, such as direct marketing.  It is ushering in what some call the "Era of
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Promiscuous Publication."
2 The danger this era portends is that what is gained in
efficiency of health care provision may be lost in erosion of privacy.  Privacy
advocates could learn a new approach to this problem from an unlikely teacher:
publishers of intellectual property—specifically the American music industry.
The music industry until recently feared ruin from the unauthorized swapping
and rebroadcasting of high-quality audio reproductions among its customers, a
phenomenon enabled by increasingly cheap networks, cheap data storage, and
cheap processors—again, the Era of Promiscuous Publication.  Despite access
to a sympathetic Congress and extensive enforcement resources, the music
industry has found recourse to law largely unavailing against this tide of
technological progress.  The industry is now embarking on a different strategy—
changing the technology itself.  At the core of the technological response lies the
idea of “trusted systems”: computer databases of the rights and privileges of
specific entities vis-à-vis information, linked to hardware and software that
recognize and enforce those rights.  If fully deployed, trusted systems could
trump the Era of Promiscuous Publication with what I call an “Era of Trusted
Privication”: one in which a well-enforced technical rights architecture would
enable the distribution of information to a large audience—publication—while
simultaneously, and according to rules generated by the controller of the
information, not releasing it freely into general circulation—privication.
In my view there is a profound relationship between those who wish to protect
intellectual property and those who wish to protect privacy.  Their common desire
to control the distribution of information, and the music industry’s potential
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success at regaining control through the implementation of trusted systems, offer
several lessons to privacy advocates seeking to protect the privacy interests
increasingly threatened by the advent of the Era of Promiscuous Publication.  I
will explore these lessons first by mapping out the problem presented to the
music industry by the advent of fast, cheap, and perfect copies, along with the
music industry’s legal and technological strategies for regaining control.  Second,
I will describe the similar problem faced by privacy advocates in the arena of
medical privacy, the legal solutions that have been and might be attempted, and
a hypothetical technological solution that demonstrates the enforcement power of
the trusted system.  Finally, I will look beyond the enforcement potential of the
technological solution to demonstrate how thinking in terms of privication
architectures might help negotiate the allocation of rights to medical data to
account for the interests of individual “producers” of personal data in ways that
need not disparage the legitimate interests of the sophisticated institutional
players who wish to consume that data.STANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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II. The Music Industry:  A Trajectory of Intellectual Property
Worries—and Responses to Them—in a Digitally
Networked Environment
A. A New Problem: Quick, cheap, perfect copies
John Perry Barlow laid down the gauntlet to those representing intellectual
property interests on February 8, 1996 in a “Declaration of the Independence of
Your increasingly obsolete information industries would perpetuate themselves by
proposing laws, in America and elsewhere, that claim to own speech itself throughout the
world. These laws would declare ideas to be another industrial product, no more noble
than pig iron. In our world, whatever the human mind may create can be reproduced and
distributed infinitely at no cost. The global conveyance of thought no longer requires your
factories to accomplish.
3
The information industries did not need Barlow’s help to know fear.  The initial
consumer boom of the World Wide Web in the mid-nineties spurred widespread
and grave concern among authors and publishers—and study among
commentators—about a loss of intellectual property protection.  The Net featured
perfect, cheap, anonymous and quick copying of data; these features and their
implications were not lost on wary publishers any more than they were on
cyberenthusiasts.
4  As one who identified with the former summarized: “[O]n the
                                                   
3 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (visited Nov. 27, 1999)
<http://www.eff.org/pub/Misc/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/barlow_0296.declaration>. John
Perry Barlow is co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a non-profit organization
devoted to protecting privacy and free expression on the Internet.  See Electronic Frontier
Foundation, About EEF (visited Dec. 5, 1999) <http://www.eff.org/EFFdocs/about_eff.html>.
4 See, e.g., Robert A. Cinque, Making Cyberspace Safe For Copyright: The Protection of
Electronic Works in a Protocol to the Berne Convention, FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1258, 1258–1259
(1995) (“With the click of a mouse or the tap of a key, virtually anyone with a computer and aSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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Internet, copying can take place without limits, without visibility, and without cost
to the copier; a formula that spells disaster for authors to control use of their
works.”
5
In an essay portending massive challenges to copyright law from the Net—if
only because even merely viewing information online often entails, as a technical
matter, making a copy of it—David Post retells the story of three eras of
publishing, the latest ushered in by the Internet:
-  Era of Monastic Manuscript: Copyright unnecessary to authors or publishers
-  Era of Gutenberg Press: Copyright necessary to authors and publishers
-  Era of Promiscuous Publication: Copyright enforcement doubtful.
6
                                                                                                                                                        
telephone can obtain vast quantities of information from almost anywhere on the globe.  These
conditions pose a formidable challenge to the international protection of intellectual property.
Copyrighted works, which include films, novels, musical works and other forms of expression, are
especially vulnerable to piracy.”);  Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "Information
Superhighway": Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466
(1995) (“The prospect of pervasive audience access to and ability to copy and further disseminate
works of authorship challenges the traditional roles not only of information providers - be they
publishers, motion picture producers or record producers - but of the individuals who create the
works.”); Dale J. Ream, Copyrighted Works & Computer Networks: Is Protection Possible?, 4
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 115 (1995) (“Technology seems to be outpacing the law, and a
combination of non-statutory solutions may be the best way to correct the strain on copyright law
caused by network technology.”); Laurent Belsie, Who Pays for What On Tomorrow's Internet?
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 25, 1995, at 1 (“It's a thought that strikes terror in the
hearts of entrepreneurs: What if their visions of on-line commerce turn out to be a mirage? What
if all the information they hope to sell on the so-called Information Highway is free?”); Ralph
Blumenthal, Thieves in the Idea Marketplace, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 11, 1995, at A13
(“[T]echnology is fast outracing the law, and the unauthorized copying, manipulation and sale of
creative property, at home and abroad, are disrupting licensing structures that date to the
founding of the American Republic.”);  Jube Shriver, Jr., Digital Double Trouble: From Rap Music
to Medial Formulas, Little Seems Safe From Duplication, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Apr. 11, 1994, at
A1 (“Armed with personal computers and digital recorders, entrepreneurs around the globe are
using digital technology in more foreboding ways. They are making unauthorized copies of
billions of dollars' worth of music, movies, software, pharmaceutical formulas and other so-called
intellectual property.”) (hereinafter Digital Double Trouble).
5 Marshall Leaffer, Protecting Authors' Rights In A Digital Age, 27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 1 (1995),
6 David Post, New Wine, Old Bottles: The Evanescent Copy, AMERICAN LAWYER, May 1995 at
103. This warning of a data free-for-all on the Internet still echoes today.  Several recent
headline-grabbing (civil and criminal) crackdowns on alleged music pirating illustrate that the fear
of illicit copying is alive and kicking in 1999.  See, e.g., Warez Chatters Busted: Piracy, WIRED
NEWS, Nov. 17, 1999, available at (visited Nov. 28, 1999)
<http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,32616,00.html> (“The Business Software Alliance is
pressing charges against 25 people the organization accuses of trafficking pirated software on
the Internet.”); RIAA Suing Upstart Startup, WIRED NEWS, Nov. 15, 1999, available at (visited Nov.
29, 1999) <http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,32559,00.html> (describing the Recording
Industry Association of America’s civil action against a music software company for contributorySTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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Before the widespread embrace of the Internet, the shape given intellectual
property law by Congress and the courts had, along with selective enforcement
by public and private entities, led to a coarse détente among authors, publishers,
and consumers of intellectual property.
7  This status quo countenanced some
level of possibly illegal copying in the world; after all, no law is perfectly enforced.
The situation was tolerable, and some even suggested that copying, legal or not,
aided authors.  A little copying on the margin could be a form of “try before you
buy,” a means of building reputation or “mindshare,”
8 or even an efficient means
of price discrimination—selling at least one copy of a work to a group of related
consumers who would not individually buy it at full price.
9
                                                                                                                                                        
copyright infringement); Bill Schackner, Carnegie Mellon raids students' PC files over MP3s, THE
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 11, 1999, at 6F (“Seventy-one students lost their in-room links to
the campus network for the rest of the semester after the school conducted a surprise inspection
of computer files and found they had publicly posted audio files containing copyrighted music.
The school said it had acted to guard against claims from the recording industry, which a couple
of years ago launched a campaign to discourage music piracy among students on technology-
oriented campuses, including Carnegie Mellon.”).
7 While international treaty provides for some degree of uniformity of copyright law from one
nation to the next (see Intellectual Property Regimes for the Information Age: Policies of the
United States, the European Union and the World Intellectual Property Organization, 3 B.U. J.
Sci. & Tech. L. 9 (1997)), some nations remain outside the web of intellectual property treaties,
and with others there exist differing judicial interpretations, levels of actual enforcement, and
cultural norms of copying.  For example, China has recently entered the web of treaties, but
enforcement is still doubtful. See Assafa Endeshaw, A Critical Assessment Of The U.S.-China
Conflict On Intellectual Property, 6 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 295 (1996).
8 See, e.g., Laurence Zuckerman, Lotus Gears Up To Get a Slice Of Internet Pie, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, Sept. 16, 1996, at D1 (“Without ‘mindshare’ -- the attention of thousands of third-party
software developers, industry analysts, trade journalists and customers -- even the best
technologies can founder.”);  Steve Lohr, The old-media dinosaurs seem to be having a rebirth,
THE NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997, at D5  (“[T]he power of Internet technology . . . has not
rewritten the rules of competition for consumer media. Perhaps the most valuable commodity on
the Internet is attention, or ‘mindshare,’ and established brands and mainstream promotion are
invaluable in delivering it.”).
9 See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84 (“Familiarity is an
important asset in the world of information. It may often be true that the best way to raise demand
for your product is to give it away. While this has not always worked with shareware, it could be
argued that there is a connection between the extent to which commercial software is pirated and
the amount which gets sold. Broadly pirated software, such as Lotus 1-2-3 or WordPerfect,
becomes a standard and benefits from Law of Increasing Returns based on familiarity. In regard
to my own soft product, rock 'n' roll songs, there is no question that the band I write them for, theSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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The growth of the Net raised the level of copying exponentially, since it made
copying so much easier, the possibility of detection, prosecution and punishment
so much more remote, and successive generations of copies as perfectly
copyable as originals.
 10  Further, few cultural barriers stood in the way of
consumers taking advantage of the situation; the norm against copying—
especially electronic copying—was and is not as strong, say, as the norm against
stealing.
11
Nowhere is this illustrated so vividly as with the popular music industry.
Within the past two years consumers have gained access to, and begun to
embrace, technologies that allow them to copy music sold on compact discs
                                                                                                                                                        
Grateful Dead, has increased its popularity enormously by giving them away. We have been
letting people tape our concerts since the early seventies, but instead of reducing the demand for
our product, we are now the largest concert draw in America, a fact that is at least in part
attributable to the popularity generated by those tapes”); Yannis Bakos, Erik Brynjolfsson, and
Douglas Lichtman, Shared Information Goods, 42 J. Law & Econ. 117 (1999);  J.F., The
Shareware Alternative -- The 'try before you buy' market is thriving, INFORMATIONWEEK, August
14, 1995 at 32; Dan Gutman, Shareware lets you try before you buy, SUCCESS, Nov 1996, at 64.
10 See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1193, 1196
n.8 (1998) (“The digitalization of information makes simple the reproduction and quick
transmission of perfect copies through cyberspace.  This technological transformation disturbs
the truce that has so far existed between information producers and consumers.  Not surprisingly,
a fierce battle now rages to revise the law of copyright and establish a new truce in this new
technological regime”).
11 See Barlow, supra note 8 at 84 ("The laws regarding unlicensed reproduction of commercial
software are clear and stern...and rarely observed. Software piracy laws are so practically
unenforceable and breaking them has become so socially acceptable that only a thin minority
appears compelled, either by fear or conscience, to obey them. When I give speeches on this
subject, I always ask how many people in the audience can honestly claim to have no
unauthorized software on their hard disks. I've never seen more than 10 percent of the hands go
up. Whenever there is such profound divergence between law and social practice, it is not society
that adapts. Against the swift tide of custom, the software publishers' current practice of hanging
a few visible scapegoats is so obviously capricious as to only further diminish respect for the
law"); Software Industry Information Association, Software Publisher's Association Anti-Piracy
Education Initiative (visited November 26, 1999)
<http://www.siia.net/piracy/programs/education.htm> (working to "teach members of the
educational community about the responsible and legal use of software"); Hilary Rosen, 1999 WL
988372, (“We also believe in education – letting music fans know that piracy hurts the artists theySTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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perfectly.
12  The entertainment industry has considered this a mortal threat,
13 one
that has become particularly acute with the increasing popularity of “MP3” audio
compression, a standard that compresses digital music into a package small
enough that users can ship music around the Internet without straining their local
bandwidth.
14
The vernacular of music sharing does some justice to the oft-invoked “piracy”
label: thanks to MP3 compression and the software built around it, a single
person can obtain a music CD, “rip” its tracks onto her hard drive
15 and then
“burn” them onto a new blank CD, email them to friends, or even set up a
“SHOUTcast” station, broadcasting music live to anyone on the Internet who
cares to listen.
16  Testifying before Congress in late 1997, the general counsel of
the Recording Industry Association of America put it quite starkly and with only
                                                   
12 CD Piracy Soared in 1998, Music Industry Group Says, NATIONAL POST (April 8, 1999) (“The
Recording Industry Association of America said the number of counterfeit compact discs made
illegally in U.S. facilities rose to about 338,500, up 163% from 129,000 in 1997. The number of
recordings illegally made on blank discs through Internet downloads and other means, rose to
103,971, from a scant 442 in 1997. The figures reflect products that were confiscated on street
corners, in flea markets, retail outlets and via Internet sales, the RIAA said.”).
13 See Heather D. Rafter, et al., Streaming Into the Future: Music and Video on the Internet, 547
Pat/PLI 605, 609 (1999) (“What is different about the Internet's influence on the music business is
that it is potentially toppling an industry that has kept control in the hands of a few record labels
and sustained high profit margins for a long period of time. Until the advent of the Internet, those
few companies seemed invincible, in part protected by a strong legislative scheme and statutory
provisions as well as a solid, tightly-controlled method of distribution. Digital distribution of music,
that is, the distribution and downloading of music off the Internet, is threatening to change this
well-established system.”) While the debate has focused on the music industry, other sectors of
the entertainment industry have expressed similar concerns.  Jack Valenti, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Motion Picture Association of America, Testimony Before Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection, Committee on Commerce, U.S. House of
Representatives, Oct. 28, 1999 (“Copyright piracy on the Internet threatens to cause enormous
damage to our industry, and to other intellectual property industries.  If we are not successful in
combating the Internet piracy threat, we could soon be faced with losses that dwarf the dollar
amounts we lose today.”).
14 See Barak D. Jolish, Scuttling the Music Pirate: Protecting Recordings in the Age of the
Internet, 17 SPG Ent. & Sports Law 9 (1999).
15 See Audiocatalyst (visited Nov. 29, 1999) <www.xingtech.com> for one such program.
16 See (visited Nov. 29, 1999) <www.shoutcast.com>, where the enabling software is available for
free and a list of individuals’ “radio” stations is maintained.STANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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slight hyperbole: “Today, one individual, in less time than it takes me to read this
testimony, can send a full-length album to more than fifty million Internet users.”
17
The publishing industries initially responded by using their political power to
broaden and strengthen the scope and application of legal protections against
unauthorized copying of their work.  However, as it became clear that the
problem would not be overcome by additional difficult-to-enforce legal rules, the
music industry has turned to technology backed by law as a more promising
avenue for redress.  An examination of each of these types of responses, legal
and technical, yields possible ways that privacy advocates can ultimately benefit
from the lessons of the music industry’s experience.
B. Solution 1.0: Buttressing Copyright and Contract
Those who worried about the Net’s effect on intellectual property were not
idle; as a first step, they called for—and in many cases, got—a strengthening of
intellectual property laws and public enforcement to counter the sea change in
information-sharing abilities wrought by the Net.
18  Some of these provisions
                                                   
17 Testimony of Cary H. Sherman, Internet Piracy and H.R. 2265, the “No Electronic Theft Act,”
Sep. 11, 1997, 1997 WL 566007 (F.D.C.H.). A variety of portable music players are now on the
market; users can put copies of songs in MP3 format onto the players and then listen without
being near a personal computer. See (visited Nov. 29, 1999) <www.rioport.com>.
18 See Belsie, Who Pays for What On Tomorrow’s Internet, supra note 15 (“[P]ublishers are
pushing a traditional approach, asking that existing copyright laws be strengthened. Last month,
this argument got a huge boost from the Clinton administration. Its white paper ''Intellectual
Property and the National Information Infrastructure'' recommended much the same thing.”);
Mitch Betts, Pirates lurk on the info highway; Increased concerns cause publishers to pull
material off the Internet, COMPUTERWORLD, Jul. 25, 1994, at 60 (describing a Clinton
administration proposal for “fine-tuning the federal copyright laws” to address” digital copying);
Jeff Leeds, Cyberspace Copyright Proposal Draws Praise, LOS ANGELES TIMES, July 8, 1994, at
D1 (“Endorsing a first, tentative step toward modernizing the nation's intellectual property laws,
the entertainment and information industries today welcomed a draft recommendation from the
Clinton Administration on extending copyright law to cover on-line services and other corners ofSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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were specifically designed to increase penalties for copying using electronic
means.
19  The music industry in particular sought to protect itself by making
extensive use of the private right of action for federal copyright violations.
20  The
existence of this right presumably helps to prevent at least some forms of open,
static and notorious music piracy from taking place through the World Wide Web.
Even in a crowded domain name space,
21 no one has dared to reserve, much
less place content within, say, <www.piratedmusic.com> or
<www.stolensingles.com>.
22  At least one music industry group is working hard
on new technologies that can identify threads of streamed music coursing
                                                                                                                                                        
cyberspace.”); Michael D. McCoy and Needham J. Boddie, II, Cybertheft: Will Copyright Law
Prevent Digital Tyranny on the Superhighway?, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169 (1995) (“Given the
vital importance of an integrated superhighway, government likely will take certain regulatory
steps to garner industry support.  Revising the current copyright laws may provide the necessary
protection to prevent technological isolation.”); Shiver, Digital Double Trouble, supra note 17
(describing efforts by the Recording Industry Association of America to strengthen and reform
copyright law in the digital context);  Michael Coblenz, Intellectual Property Crimes, 9 Alb. L.J.
Sci. & Tech. 235 (1999) (discussing the trend towards criminalization of intellectual property
infringement in reaction to the increased ease of transferring information by computer and the
Internet); You can run, but you can't hide; industry revs up new campaign to bag corporate
software pirates, COMPUTER SHOPPER, August 1991, at 107; Paul M. Eng, Ed., Keelhauling
Software Pirates, BUSINESS WEEK, February 18, 1991 (reporting the Software Publisher's
Association cracking down on corporate software piracy).
19 See No Electronic Theft (NET) Act. Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified as
amendments to 17 U.S.C. 101-803, and 18 U.S.C. 2319) (Specifically, NET makes it a felony to
violate 17 U.S.C. §506(a)(2), under penalty of imprisonment or fines under 18 U.S.C. §2319(c));
Stephanie Brown, The No Electronic Theft Act: Stop Internet Piracy! 9 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent.
L. 147 (Fall, 1998).
20 17 U.S.C. 502-505; see  Recording Industry Reinforces Its Strategy to Fight Against Internet
Piracy, EUROPEAN REPORT, Nov. 4, 1999 ("The International Federation of the Phonographic
Industry (IFPI) has unveiled a new coordinated global strategy against Internet piracy,
announcing actions against hundreds of infringing sites in more than 20 countries world-wide.
This strategy was put in place by allied national groups of the IFPI in the form of warning letters
and legal initiatives."); Hunting Pirates, PC MAGAZINE, Dec. 14, 1999 at 11 ("The music industry is
taking aim at allegedly illegal music files posted on the Internet. In a global antipiracy effort, the
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) says that it is implementing legal
actions designed to shut down sites offering illegal music files."); Courtney Macavinta, “Teen
Charged In Connection With DVD Cracking Tool, CNet News.com <http://news.cnet.com/news/0-
1005-200-1531192.html?tag=st.ne.1002>.
21 See Matt Richtel, New Domain Names Set a Record in 1998, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1999, at G3.
22 See Network Solutions, Inc., Whois Queries, (visited Nov. 29, 1999)
<http://www.networksolutions.com/cgi-bin/whois/whois/> (no match for “piratedmusic.com” orSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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through the data flows of the Internet-at-large, for the purposes of hunting down
and suing (or at least threatening) music pirates.
23  Additionally, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act’s
24 provision for expedited subpoenas to Internet
service providers seeking the identities of people posting unauthorized
copyrighted material has been well-used.
25
A litigation win is not always necessary to achieve an important industry goal:
the Recording Industry Association of America recently lost its lawsuit
challenging the production of the “Rio” portable MP3 music player under the
Audio Home Recording Act,
26 but the manufacturers of the Rio are now
cooperating with the RIAA towards the creation of a “secure” music format.
27
Second, to provide for protection in areas where copyright law is ambiguous
or silent, or simply to buttress the default rights copyright provides, publishers
have increasingly used mass contracting to enhance control over that which they
                                                   
23 See Alice Rawsthorn, Industry Plans New Round of Tests to Build Defences Against Internet
Piracy, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jun. 4, 1998, at 8.  (“The adoption of an industry-wide system to identify
digital musical signals is regarded as one of the most important technical safeguards. Such a
system would use embedded signalling technology to enable companies to monitor any
broadcasts of their music, and whether any royalties are owed to them.”); Barak D. Jolish,
Scuttling the Music Pirate: Protecting Recordings in the Age of the Internet, 17 SPG Ent. & Sports
Law. 9, 10 (1999) (“The RIAA … employs three full-time staffers and a variety of technological
aids to uncover illegally posted music.  Using hundreds of warning latters and a handful of
lawsuits, in 1997 the RIAA alone shut down more than 250 sites, many originating from [account
holders at] universit[ies].”).
24 See notes 92 and 94, infra and accompanying text (discussing the DMCA).
25 See Jack Valenti, Access to Digital Entertainment on the Internet, Testimony, Oct. 28, 1999,
1999 WL 988371 (F.D.C.H.).
26 Recording Indus. Ass'n Of America v. Diamond Multimedia Sys.,180 F.3d 1072 (9
th Cir. 1999);
27 See Testimony of Rondal J. Moore before the House Commerce Committee Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection, WIPO One Year Later: Assessing
Consumer Access To Digital Entertainment On The Internet And Other Media, Oct. 28, 1999
(“While we were gratified that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in our favor, we
take greater satisfaction in the subsequent cooperation between the recording, computer, Internet
and consumer electronics industries to craft interoperability standards for copy protection systems
under the rubric of the Secure Digital Music Initiative.”); House Hearing Reopens Digital Copying
Debate, 11 AUDIO WEEK 43, Nov. 1, 1999 (quoting RIAA president Hilary Rosen as saying she
was almost glad to have lost the lawsuit that allowed MP3 players into the market).STANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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wish to share only so far.
28  The leading case in this area remains ProCD v.
Zeidenberg, in which a company that placed telephone directory “white pages”
data on a CD-ROM for consumer use was able to prevent a purchaser from
allowing the public at large to access his single copy of the CD-ROM over the
Internet for a fee.
29  Copyright law might well not have protected ProCD’s data, 
30
but the “shrinkwrap” license—the wording on and inside the box stating the terms
by which a purchaser such as Zeidenberg could use the software should he
choose to keep it—achieved a restriction on redistribution in copyright’s probable
absence.
31  The “extra” rights provided for by contract were found not to run afoul
of federal copyright preemption doctrine because they were generated through
voluntary agreement between the parties.
32  Whatever the wisdom of ProCD’s
holding—and much has been written on the subject—it is part of a larger trend by
which restrictions on information through public right are strengthened by the
application and enforcement of contract doctrine.
33  Indeed, efforts to have the
American Law Institute adopt a new section 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code
were expressly designed to make it clearer under state law that simply clicking
upon “I agree” while online might be enough to form a contract—one with quite
                                                   
28 See Katie Hafner, It May Be Boilerplate, But Read Before You Click, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1998,
at G3; David Nimmer, Elliot Brown, and Gary N. Frischling, The Metamorphosis of Contract into
Expand, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 17 (1999) ("publishers who follow the logic of ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg
may amplify their statutory rights simply by wrapping books in cellophane").
29 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
30 See note 19, supra.
31 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
32 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1999) (Federal copyright preemption); ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453-55.
33 See generally Brian Covotta & Pamela Sergeeff, Contract Enforceability: ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 35 (1998); Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Owners’ Rights And
Users’ Privileges On The Internet: Federal Preemption Of Shrinkwrap And On-Line Licenses, 22
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powerful, even surprising terms.
34  While the adoption of U.C.C. 2B has stalled, a
sibling effort is underway through UCITA.
35
Enhanced mass contracting is not yet a particularly important or powerful
weapon for the music industry in its current battle against music piracy.  After all,
unlike the telephone directory information in ProCD, original music is already
clearly and thoroughly (at least in theory) protected by copyright, so there are
fewer gaps in control for contract to fill.
Although these two strategies have no doubt helped to minimize large-scale,
centralized domestic music piracy, the practical difficulties of enforcing the legal
regime in the face of millions of individuals downloading and sharing MP3 files
has driven the music industry to turn to technology for an effective way to regain
and even sharpen its earlier control.  As one scholar put the problem of
intellectual property on the Internet:  “This is the law’s version of the Laffer Curve:
Just as tax revenues supposedly increase and then drop off as tax rates rise, so
too, as copying becomes easier and easier, laws to protect an author's right to
prevent unauthorized copying become more and more valuable—until, perhaps,
                                                   
34 See U.C.C. Art. 2B (Draft, Aug. 1, 1998) (visited Nov. 26, 1999)
<http://www.law.uh.edu/ucc2b/080198/080198.html> (reporter's official draft of proposed
revisions to Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B); Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property and
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1239 (1995); Lawrence Lessig, Sign It and Weep,
INDUSTRY STANDARD, Nov. 20, 1998; A. Michael Froomkin, Article 2B as Legal Software for
Electronic Contracting - Operating System or Trojan Horse?, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1023 (1998);
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Progressing Towards a Uniform Commercial Code for Electronic
Commerce or Racing Towards Nonuniformity?, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 635 (1999); Jane C.
Ginsburg, Authors as “Licensors” of “Informational Rights” Under U.C.C. Article 2B, 13 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 945 (1998); David A. Rice, Digital Information as Property and Product: U.C.C. Article
2B, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 621 (1997).
35 See Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, Draft for Approval (visited Nov. 26, 1999)
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/citam99.htm>; Robert Fox, UCITA Latest,
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, Sept. 1999 at 9; UETA (uniform electronic transactions act) and
H.R.1714 (Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act) and S. 761 (Third
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a point is reached at which copying has become so simple, so costless, that
regulation becomes virtually impossible.”
36
C. Solution 2.0: Technological self-help through trusted systems
Within the past five years, a new strategy has come to the fore to deal with
the impact upon information sharing (or, from the point of view of those who wish
control, “piracy”) by cheap processors, networks, and storage—a strategy quite
different from the incrementalism of tighter enforcement of substantively stricter
rights, whether through public law or private contract.  The strategy is ambitious,
with a fantastic payoff of control to publishers generally, and the music industry
specifically, if it can be accomplished.
The premise is simple: the Net of today is what we have made it—and the Net
of tomorrow will be however we remake it.
37  Each need not bear much
resemblance to the other.  Publishing executives who think that the unfortunate
ease of information flow is an inherent quality of the Internet—indeed, a
necessarily ever-accelerating one—suffer from “is-ism.”
38  So do neo-libertarians
who think that the Net’s current unsuitability to regulation is simply a fact of life to
be celebrated rather than an architectural decision that once made may still
require sustained practical if not theoretical defense.  The cliché that the Internet
                                                   
36 See David Post, New Wine, Old Bottles at 103
37 See Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
38 Id at p. 24 (Lessig defines is-ism as confusing how something is with how it must be.)STANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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“recognizes censorship [and presumably information blockage from any source]
as damage and routes around it” has perhaps prematurely achieved the stature
of truism.
39
How could a future Internet realistically tame the current information chaos?
Mark Stefik, a researcher at Xerox PARC, has been quietly developing and
touting an answer for several years.  Stefik is among the leading architects of so-
called “trusted systems,” technological gatekeepers that allow “authorized” flows
of information while flatly blocking “unauthorized” uses.
40  A necessary element is
the ability to structure “rights” into a calculable framework that is then
automatically enforced by the technology, whether the user pleases or not.  To
the extent that these rights architectures are made secure—when, through a
combination of hardware and software, a user who is anything less than a
talented hacker is truly constrained by the system at the behest of whoever is the
source of the information it might display—the system can be said to have “trust.”
A trusted system is one that can be trusted by a rights-holder as against the user
of the system—even if the physical system is in the custody of the user.  (This
use of the word “trust” is a term of art that should not be confused with its
colloquial meaning, a point I explore in Section III.)
                                                   
39 See James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors,
66 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 177, 178 n.3 (1997) (crediting John Gilmore with the phrase and discussing
its apocryphy).
40 Mark Stefik, The Internet Edge, (MIT Press, 1999), 197-231 (comparing the effect of
technology on copyright and privacy, describing the threat to privacy on the Internet and
describing privacy, secrecy and anonymity preserving technologies). Mark Stefik, Shifting the
Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital
Publishing, 12 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 137 (1997). Mark Stefik, Trusted Systems, SCIENTIFIC
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Multi-user operating systems have long had rudimentary “rights”
architectures.
41  Files have “owners.”  Owners can specify who else on the
system can view the file.  They can independently specify who else on the
system can alter the file—indeed, some might be permitted to view the file
without altering it, while others might be permitted to alter the file without viewing
it.  Owners can even alienate the right to assign new rights: a simple command
transfers ownership to another user.  In more sophisticated systems, “audit trails”
reveal to the owner (or to proxies to whom the owner has delegated the relevant
right) who among those authorized has peeked at a file and when.
Thus, a trusted system might include a vernacular through which a publisher
could tag a document as “not to be copied, in whole or in part.”  A consumer
could be sent the document—put more precisely, might have “read access” to
it—but upon attempting to highlight a portion, copy it, and paste it elsewhere—
perhaps in an email to send to a friend—would receive an admonition from the
computer that says “operation not allowed.”  Or a publisher might label the
document with a fifty-cent printing fee, and upon asking for a printout the
consumer would, in turn, be asked by her computer to pay fifty cents.  No
payment, no printout.
42
                                                   
41 The Official Red Hat Linux Getting Started Guide, Ownership and Permissions (visited Nov. 29,
1999) <http://www.redhat.com/corp/support/manuals/RHL-6.0-Manual/getting-started-
guide/gsg/doc026.html> (a sample of text from a UNIX manual using rights language); Erik’s
Linux Page, Dealing with User rights (visited Nov. 29, 1999)
<http://www.lysator.liu.se/~forsberg/linux/about-chmod.html>; Microsoft Technet, User rights
control by User, <http://technet.microsoft.com/cdonline/default-
f.asp?target=http://technet.microsoft.com/cdonline/content/complete/windows/winnt/winntas/man
uals/concept/xcp01.htm>.
42 For a description of at least one kind of trusted system with an eye towards intellectual property
protection, see Mark Gimbel, Some Thoughts on the Implications of Trusted Systems for
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Further, tying nuanced forms of access to information to one’s identity or
characteristics enables highly targeted price discrimination.  One could give
access to a text at “retail” price to a businessperson and at a discount to a
student; one could let certified Democrats see something that Republicans (or at
least non-Democrats) could not.
43
The music industry, then, should refrain from utter despair about piracy—and
there are signs that it is doing just that.  Trusted systems comprising computers
linked by cheap, fast (perhaps wireless) networks could enable the following
hypothetical world of commercial music:
Songs are not “sold” in even the colloquial sense of the word; rather, they are
“licensed”—both from a legal and technical standpoint.  Compact discs have
joined 8-tracks, cassettes, and phonograph records in the dustbin; their
replacements are small, generic “jukeboxes” linked by the Net to a central
repository of songs managed by a publisher.
44
An individual authenticates herself to a jukebox—perhaps with a fingerprint or
carefully scrawled signature on its back with a stylus—and then may access
specific songs that fall under her monthly payment plan.  She will be granted
access to the music archive only after parting with personal information about
herself, including name, age, address, and phone number.  (This information is
passed in a heartbeat to the publisher from her personal computer’s registration
                                                   
43 Judge Easterbrook saw the value of price discrimination as a reason to uphold the contract in
ProCD, where the consumer version of the software in question cost less than one intended for
commercial use.  Zeidenberg owned the cheaper consumer version, the license of which duly
limited his use of the software.  See Kalama M. Lui-Kwan, Digital signatures: Recent
Developments in Digital Signature Legislation and Electronic Commerce, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J.
463 (1999);  ProCD at 1450.
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module; she entered and authenticated it once, and it is now requested
constantly as she uses the computer to visit various web sites.  She has long
since set her “preferences” to release it if access to the site will be denied
otherwise.
45)
As she selects songs, her tastes are noted, allowing offers for “special” songs
not included in her monthly plan to be specifically targeted to her tastes and sent
to her across all media.
46  The songs she asks for are “streamed” to her player as
she listens, and do not remain there any more than a song stays inside a radio
after it is over.
An inaudible signal is embedded in the music; if she holds a microphone to
her headphones and thereby makes an imperfect, analog copy to an old-
fashioned cassette, her name and a unique identifier will be “in” it, permitting
prosecution for copyright infringement if the copy is found.
47  Her user license
agreement provides an alternative path for the music owner to pursue fast-track
damages, including the sending of a signal to her jukebox that permanently
disables anyone from using it until the matter is settled.
In the unlikely event that she were to abuse her access to the system by
hooking up her jukebox to an amplifier and playing the music at a backyard party
                                                   
45 See note 197, infra, for a description of “P3P,” the beginnings of such a “privacy enhancing”
system.
46 See, Hilary Rosen, President and Chief Executive Officer, Recording Industry Association of
America, Testimony Before Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
Protection, Committee on Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, Oct. 28, 1999 (describing
and extolling a similar customized marketing approach and noting that “many sites already make
customized music recommendations to returning clients based on their buying history”)
47 Kenneth Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. Legal Stud. 393 (1999); Geoff Nairn, Yet to
Make its Mark: Technolgy Digital Watermarks, LONDON FINANCIAL TIMES, March 15, 1999, at 12;
Air Force Research Laboratory, Digital Watermarking Technology (visited Nov. 29, 1999)STANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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outside her California apartment, a cheap listening post on the beach’s lifeguard
chair could be monitored by ASCAP,
48 which would use a watermark decoder to
know instantly that she was behind the cacophony—and that the particular
performance had only been paid for at the “portable personal use” rate rather
than the “noncommercial party” rate.  (Music data from listening posts might be
shared with ASCAP by the local police department, which has deployed a
network of microphones around the city to respond to the sound of gunshots in
the area.
49)
A more likely event is that she will fall behind in her monthly payments, in
which case her access to any music—except that which is heard over old-
fashioned analog “public” radios—will be cut off automatically.  (This may soon
happen; her monthly rate just doubled since her graduation from college and
corresponding loss of student discount status.)
A world like this is still at least five years off by my conservative reckoning—
and the music industry may, after consulting its own muses and the market, elect
not to invoke all the technical power that could be at its disposal.  Still, publishing
industries have already taken the first halting steps towards trusted systems
architectures.
50
                                                                                                                                                        
<http://www.rl.af.mil/div/IFB/techtrans/datasheets/H2Omark.html> (describing watermarking
technology and its uses, military and otherwise).
48 See note 47 supra.
49 See Greg Miller, Big Ear of the Law Tames Town's Gunfire; Crime: Redwood City's $100,000
System Uses Hidden Microphones, Computers to Pinpoint Gunshots, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Jan.
12, 1998 at D3; see also ShotSpotter home page (visited Nov. 29, 1999) <www.shotspotter.com>
(commercial vendor of distributed listening products).
50   Adobe Systems has designed a popular document system that enables the distribution
of “read only” written work.  “Read only” refers to a document that may be viewed but
not edited by the reader.   See Adobe,  Products: Acrobat (visited Nov. 27, 1999)
<http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/main.html>.  An online booksellerSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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complements an array of traditional books and magazines with “e-matter,” downloadable
over the Internet for a fee—and readable only on the physical computer to which it is
registered.   See Fatbrain.com,  What is e-matter (visited Nov. 27, 1999)
<http://www.fatbrain.com/ematter/e_whatis.html>.  One legal scholar has just released a
novel as e-matter.  See James Boyle,  The Shakespeare Chronicles  on Fatbrain.com
(visited Nov. 27 1999)
<http://www1.fatbrain.com/asp/bookinfo/bookinfo.asp ?theisbn=EB00003261>.  DIVX
technology was a short-lived standard for mass-producing and distributing audio-visual
content that a user could watch or listen to only a limited number of times. Its roots go
back to the technology fictionalized in the television series “Mission: Impossible”; each
episode began with a reel-to-reel tape that self-destructed after playing a message
intended only for one person’s ears. DIVX was recently abandoned as a digital video
standard, unable to compete with the more popular DVD format.  See Peter Spiegel,
Format war,  F ORBES , May 17, 1999 (“Circuit City’s…big mess is its Digital Video
Express ( Divx)  system -- specially encrypted $4.49 videodisks that can be viewed as
many times as you want in a 48-hour period; and they don't have to be returned.
DVD…is a $20 disk you can keep and play as many times as you want”) ;  Maryanne
Murray  Buechner,  Just as DVD is declared a winner in the consumer market, a new entry
called Divx tries to change the rules,  T IME  DIGITAL , April 12, 1999 (“ Divx (rhymes with
civics, short for Digital Video Express) is a feature on selected DVD players that--
paradoxically--allows you to rent movies you'll never need to return.  Divx discs are
encrypted  dvds that can be decoded and played only on a machine that has the  Divx chip;
the deck also has a modem that uses your home's regular phone line to communicate with
a sort of " Divx Central." The player dials in the first time you want to use it, then again
once a month to take care of the billing”);  Digital Video Disarray, The Washington Post,
June 25, 1999 at N70.  Manufacturers of DVD players have experimented with “regional
DVD” formats, whereby individual players can be associated with various regions of the
world.  Individual disks of audiovisual material could be coded only for one region,
enabling a more trusted temporal staggering of film and video releases across
international boundaries for price discrimination purposes.  See  Matshushita Plans
Regional DVD Formats,  OPTICAL  MEMORY  NEWS , Jun. 18, 1996.  In the United States,
digital audio tape players are designed to refuse to copy a copy.  The Audio Home Recording
Act, 17 USC § 1002 reads in relevant part:
   (a) . . . No person shall import, manufacture, or distribute any digital audio recording device or
digital audio interface device that does not conform to--
      (1) the Serial Copy Management System;
      (2) a system that has the same functional characteristics as the Serial Copy Management
System and requires that copyright and generation status information be accurately sent,
received, and acted upon between devices using the system's method of serial copying
regulation and devices using the Serial Copy Management System; or
      (3) any other system certified by the Secretary of Commerce as prohibiting unauthorized
serial copying.
It is worth noting that the he AHRA itself provides no definition for “Serial Copy Management
Nimmer notes, “the result is that the enacted text, standing alone, cannot
be interpreted; resort to legislative history of the bill -- in particular, to the Technical Reference
Document that contained the specifications for the SCMS -- is therefore unavoidable.”  NIMMERSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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For the music industry, these steps entail the development of a standard in
cooperation with hardware and software developers called the Secure Digital
Music Initiative, or SDMI, to replace MP3.  Its protocols—still in flux—
contemplate many of the features hypothesized above.
51
To be sure, these steps are merely beginnings, and they include as many
failures as successes.
52  However, there are reasons why the music industry
appears to be placing its faith in technology, knowing full well that the industry’s
interests cannot be assumed to be identical to those of the hardware and
software vendors who would have to support trusted technology, and that a
                                                                                                                                                        
ON COPYRIGHT, Ch. 8b. The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, § 8B.03.  Despite the technical
abstruseness of these specifications, Nimmer states with some certainty a simple principle of
serial copying under the act:  “The controls of the SCMS . . . prevent making copies from all but
original recordings. Accordingly, a first generation copy may be played on a tape deck/recorder
equipped with an SCMS and enjoyed in one's living room; it may not, by contrast, be used to
make additional copies.”
51 According to the Recording Industry Association of America’s website, SDMI “will answer
consumer demand for convenient accessibility to quality digital music, enable copyright protection
for artists' work, and enable technology and music companies to build business models for
consumers that will expand the availability of music on-line.”  Recording Industry Association of
America, Technology, (visited Nov. 19, 1999) <http://www.riaa.com/tech/tech_sd.htm>;  See also,
Jennifer Sullivan, RIAA Unveils Anti-MP3 Plan, Dec. 15, 1998, (visited Nov. 29, 1999)
<http://www.wired.com/news/news/culture/story/16853.html> (“SDMI poses a challenge to MP3, a
prolific but controversial audio format that compresses music files at near-CD-quality sound for
easy distribution over the Internet. Users love its convenience, but the RIAA says the technology
allows for massive music piracy. The RIAA is calling for more security in the new format.”).
52 The protections by which the first generation of DVDs was to be uncopyable were cracked
recently.  See Mike Musgrove, Hackers Unlock Hollywood DVD Code; Encryption Mistake Allows
Film Copies, THE WASHINGTON POST, November 4, 1999 (“The system used to protect DVD-
formatted movies from being copied--a feature that took years for the entertainment industry to
agree on before it would green-light this popular technology--has been cracked. A group of
programmers has duplicated the software equivalent of a skeleton key and placed it on the
Internet for anyone to download. Using this tiny program, anyone owning a personal computer
with a DVD-ROM drive--an increasingly common feature--can unlock a DVD movie and record a
perfect digital copy of it onto his hard drive”); Josh Chetwynd, DVD 'key' changed after copy
protection cracked, USA TODAY,  November 9, 1999 at 3D (“The news did not stun Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA) chief Jack Valenti, who recently testified that it was "only a matter
of time" before the technology, once considered unbreakable, was compromised. But the
revelation has left DVD manufacturers scrambling to protect the burgeoning business from being
hurt by the prospect of future piracy.”) (New DVDs are encoded using a different, uncracked
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number of independent creative minds will be bent on breaking any locks it might
convince the institutional technologists to come up with.
At least one formal process has at last coalesced through which a new
generation of computer hardware can augment the software of “trust,”
demonstrating cooperation between content providers and consumer systems
architects, and posing a new kind of challenge to those who would seek to crack
the code.  The Trusted Computing Platform Alliance was formed to little fanfare
in October 1999, by the most powerful companies in information technology:
53
The Trusted Computing Platform Alliance, or TCPA, was formed by Compaq, HP,
IBM, Intel and Microsoft.  All five companies have been individually working on improving
the trust available within the PC for years.  These companies came to an important
conclusion: the level, or “amount”, of trust they were able to deliver to their customers,
and upon which a great deal of the information revolution depended, needed to be
increased and security solutions for PC's needed to be easy to deploy, use and manage.
An open alliance was formed to work on creating a new computing platform for the next
century that will provide for improved trust in the PC platform.
54
Where before a simple illicit software patch might break a particular protection
scheme, the TCPA’s work could ensure that a computer owner might have to
take a soldering iron to the computer’s circuit board in order to circumvent a
protection scheme, significantly raising the costs of quick and perfect copying to
rival those of the monastic manuscript era.
The ambition of this technical strategy in response to the panic over the
Internet free-for-all is to hasten a new era (or perhaps take us back to an earlier
                                                   
53 See Trusted Computing Platform Alliance, Compaq, HP, IBM, Intel, and Microsoft Announce
Open Alliance to Build Trust and Security into PC’s for e-Business, (visited Nov. 27, 1999)
<http://www.trustedpc.org/press/pdf/TCPA%20Press%20Rel.7.pdf.>
54 Trusted Computing Platform Alliance, Home Page (visited Nov. 27, 1999)
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one) before the current one has truly settled in.  We might revise Post’s
recounted timetable as follows:
-  Era of Monastic Manuscript: Copyright unnecessary to authors or publishers
-  Era of Gutenberg Press: Copyright necessary to authors and publishers
-  Era of Promiscuous Publication: Copyright enforcement doubtful.
-  Era of Trusted Privication: Copyright unnecessary to authors or publishers.
The term “privication” is meant to capture the heretofore-unlikely coupling of
mass distribution of information to “authorized” users with tight control over its
use—at least along the dimensions of perfect, instantaneous, and anonymous
copying.
55  That control is enabled through private rather than public means,
eliminating the need for copyright to the extent that the trusted system can be
relied upon to protect information.
56
There is a caveat to this use of private means: the government has been
asked by publishers to buttress the security of an imperfect privately deployed
trusted system by penalizing those who crack it.  The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act does just this, providing for civil and criminal penalties for those
who circumvent technological protection measures, and in some cases for those
who simply make available technologies that can be used for circumvention (and
little else).
57  Passage of the DMCA was a high priority for the entertainment
                                                   
55 The first and only time I have heard the term used was at a 1998 Harvard/MIT conference in
which invited scholars commented on student work.  See “The Legal/Technical Architecture of
Cyberspace” Dec. 6, 1998, at Berkman Center For Internet and Society, conference description,
(visited Nov. 27, 1999)  <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/architect.html>.
56 Pamela Samuelson noted this possibility as early as 1994.  See Pamela Samuelson, Will the
Copyright Office be Obsolete in the Twenty-First Century?, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 55, 58-60
(1994) (“Why would one need copyright protection, let alone need to register a claim of copyright
with a Copyright Office, if it becomes virtually impossible to copy a work because of the
technological protection attached to it?”).
57 See 17 U.S.C. 1201.  The prohibitions are stayed while the Library of Congress analyzes what
exceptions—such as fair use—should exist to permit users to attempt to crack an otherwise-
covered system.  Note that these exceptions would still only be defensive privilege against
prosecution by someone who had successfully cracked a trusted scheme.  They do not grant an
easement-like right of access, only a right to attempt to break in, with the owner entitled to lockSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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industry, and by all accounts its power in the development of the legislation was
as strong as with other copyright-related matters taken up by Congress—and the
power of disparate “fair use” interests correspondingly weak.
58
The DMCA’s proscriptions are worded in a way that may protect only those
trusted systems that contain copyrighted works in the first instance: “No person
shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under this title.”
59  Works protected under Title 17 are works
protected by copyright.  But this limitation could become a lively area of
interpretation.  If a trusted system is deployed to protect both copyrighted and
non-copyrightable material—whether in the same physical database or not—
would cracking the database to gain access solely to the noncopyrightable
material be punishable under the DMCA?  If so, it is possible that trusted
systems covering large databases of unprotectable information
60 could be
brought under the DMCA’s protection by the mere presence of a copyrighted
work elsewhere in the database.  However this issue is resolved—and I do not
mean to suggest that it will be particularly more vexing than the statutory
interpretation issues that courts face every day—it shows that government can
                                                                                                                                                        
the property up as tightly as possible.  Cf. Brown, Copyduty, supra note 99, at ¶¶ 8 - 9
(comparing fair use under a hypothetical “copyduty” regime to a public easement in real property).
For a critique of the DMCA’s scope, see Pamela Samuelson, Why the Anti-Circumvention
Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 519 (1999).
58 See Malla Pollack, The Right To Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the
Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause and the First Amendment, 17 Cardozo Arts &
Ent. L.J. 47 (1999) (describing the Digital Millenium Copyright Act as "butchering fair use");
Andrew L. Shapiro, The Disappearance Of Cyberspace And The Rise Of Code, 8 Seton Hall
Const. L.J. 703, 719 n.44 (1998) (“It is safe to assume, by this presumption of virtual
displacement, that many materials previously distributed physically (books, CD's, etc.) with a
traditional intellectual property balance between fair use and exclusive control will likely be
disseminated online with trusted systems and no such balance.”)
59 See 17 U.S.C. 1201.
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choose to enhance the effectiveness of private information control regimes, even
aside from legislating substantive information property rights or enforcing
contracts.
61
Indeed, the music industry appears to credit the DMCA for adding steam to
the early stages of its Secure Digital Music Initiative—not just for protecting the
final result, but for implicitly urging technology companies to take the music
industry’s call for a trusted system seriously.
62  The story of effective privication
so far requires the manufacturers of hardware and software to design new
technologies with publishers, rather than consumers, as the “customers” to whom
they respond.  In the case of the Trusted PC Alliance, the members appear to
comprise only the manufacturers.
63  There exist advisors, but their identities are
not currently available to non-members.
64
The music industry—in a split with the motion picture industry—has recently
tempered its cries of falling skies,
65 and a recent spate of cooperation with
technologists over SDMI may be why.  Relations with the company producing
portable MP3 players have been patched,
66 and the president of the RIAA now
says that the “rocky marriage” of the technology industry and the creative
                                                   
61 See James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors,
66 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 177, 201 (1997) (“The Internet Trinity tells us that information wants to be free
and that the thick fingers of Leviathan are too clumsy to hold it back. The position is less clear if
that information is guarded by digital fences which themselves are backed by a state power
maintained through private systems of surveillance and control.”)
62 See Rosen, Testimony Before Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
Protection, Committee on Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, Oct. 28, 1999, supra note
83 (“Enactment of the DMCA ended years of antagonism between the entertainment and
copyright industries and the technology and consumer electronic industries.”)
63 See TCPA, List of Members (visited Nov. 27, 1999)
<http://www.trustedpc.org/home/members.htm>.
64 See TCPA, List of Advisors (visited Nov. 27, 1999)
<http://www.trustedpc.org/home/advisor.htm>, which requires a password for access.
65 See House Hearing Reopens Digital Copying Debate, 11 AUDIO WEEK 43, Nov. 1, 1999.STANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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community is now on much firmer ground.
67  The SDMI boasts more than 110
companies in the music, consumer electronics, and technology industries,
enjoying a “mutuality of interests” flowing from Congress’s DMCA framework.
68
Consumers do not have a seat at the table, only an ultimate veto in the
marketplace.
69
An agreement among the members of the alliance on trusted systems
standards could potentially limit the choice of information technology
environments among consumers—whether these consumers are publishers or
readers of information.  The courts might thus theoretically intervene for antitrust
reasons and then assert general policy interests as well, though they have been
loathe to do so in other private standards-settings efforts, perhaps because
agreement to achieve interoperability can be so beneficial.
70  And, as we have
seen, Congress has been clear about its willingness to foster such initiatives.
Having Congress merely foster such initiatives, rather than mandate a
specific technology solution, may be preferable to both the technology industry
                                                                                                                                                        
66 See note 27, supra.
67 See Rosen, Testimony Before Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
Protection, Committee on Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, Oct. 28, 1999, 1999 WL
988372; supra note 79.
68 Id. (rosen testimony)
69 See, e.g., Michael Robertson, Playing The SDMI Blues, MICHAEL’S MINUTES, June 30, 1999,
available at MP3.com’s web page (visited Nov. 29 1999)
<http://bboard.mp3.com/mp3/ubb/Forum8/HTML/000038.html> (“While the RIAA touts the
"openness" of the process, it is anything but open to the public.”).
70 See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 Conn. L. Rev.
1041 Summer, 1996 at 1079 (“the Sherman Act should treat joint standard-setting organizations
as generally procompetitive forces in standardized markets, and that antitrust scrutiny of such
groups should focus on potential anticompetitive behavior by firms within such a group”);  Robert
Heidt, Industry Self-Regulation and the Useless Concept "Group Boycott", 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1507,
(November 1986) (analyzing the antitrust consequences of standard setting organizations);
Dennis W. Carlton and J. Mark Klamer, The Need for Coordination Among Firms, with Special
Reference to Network Industries,  50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 446 (Spring, 1983) (arguing that in spite of
potential stifling of competition, coordinated action may be necessary to achieve efficiency).  See
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and the music industry.  So long as the two can work together on a private
standard, they are satisfied to retain the flexibility to quietly hash out its details.
But the last time technologists and publishers were unable to agree on
standards, the latter sought—and got—legislative fiat to deploy a desired
platform in the form of the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992.  The AHRA
prohibited the “import, manufacture, or distribut[ion of] any digital audio recording
device or digital audio interface device that does not conform to … the Serial
Copy Management System[,]” which would prevent a copy of material tagged as
“not to be copied” from itself being copied.
71
Standardized architectures of privication may thus be built and wielded by
private hands, but their technology is no simple substitute for law: law can readily
intervene to bolster or weaken such systems, and might be critical to securing
adoption of—if not outright agreement about—the standards that the developers
and users will share.
III. Lessons from the publisher: The power of privication
architectures
I now review some of the features of trusted privication architectures that
make them distinct from law even as they rely upon it.  These features allow
publishers to control their work more readily than through law alone, and
ultimately point to ways that privacy interests can be better vindicated.
                                                   
71 See 17 U.S.C. 1002(a); Audio Home Recording Act 17 U.S.C 1000-1010; Gary S. Lutzker,
Dat's All Folks: Cahn v. Sony And The Audio Home Recording Act Of 1991 - Merrie Melodies Or
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A. Discrimination on the basis of consumer characteristics.
Mass publishing has typically by necessity contemplated an undifferentiated
market.  One cannot distinguish—and the price discriminate—among buyers of
intellectual property except in quite crude ways.  A publisher might attempt a
temporal staging of a new book—the more expensive hardcover edition sold to
those who are willing to pay more to buy now, followed by a cheaper paperback
edition for those who are more price-sensitive—is a familiar strategy, but the
ready transferability of intellectual property eliminates most other schemes of
discrimination.  Indeed, the first sale doctrine, by which one legitimately
encountering a particular copy of a protected work may lend or resell it without
restriction, ensures that most serious attempts to distinguish among buyers can
be met with arbitrage.
72  Privication can change that, because the systems that
enable it can cheaply couple information gathering about a buyer with the
quotation of a price, while preventing cheap arbitrage between those who are
offered a discount and those who are not.  Thus a student gets access to music
at a given ongoing rate but cannot readily attain custody of a “copy” of it which in
turn may be transferred or simply copied to another person.
B. Nuance in provision of desired information.
With a trusted system, “access” to a work can have a spectrum of meanings
far more subtle and powerful than, say, the binary option of either giving
someone a compact disc or not.  As the hypothetical future of music distributionSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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described above suggests, unlike traditional publishing, where it is hard to
physically dispossess someone of a work after she has bought it, the opportunity
to “stream” information—making it available for momentary exposure without
giving an actual copy to the consumer—suggests completely new models of
information provision with corresponding new metrics of remuneration.  A single
song can, at the discretion of the publisher, remain a product to be sold and re-
sold, or repackaged as a service in which a consumer buys rights to listen to a
song for a period of time or a discrete number of plays, after which the rights
lapse.  Furthermore, songs can be unbundled from one another, no longer
forcing publishers to set the boundaries of a given “album.”
C. Prevention rather than punishment of undesired behavior.
The effectiveness of traditional “rule and sanction” law as a means of
behavior control is a function of its certainty, swiftness, severity, and normative
acceptance.  The ability of individuals to swap copyrighted music without being
readily identified makes the prospect of punishment quite remote, despite a strict
law on the books clearly proscribing the act in question.  And while it may be
difficult to overstate the level of government support for strong intellectual
property protection, prosecutorial commitment to expending scarce resources to
prosecute individual intellectual property crimes is not likely to be strong; so far
only “ringleaders” of intellectual property piracy groups have been targeted.
Similarly, though the industry has no reluctance to bring private causes of action
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against perceived infringers, litigation is costly, time-consuming, and poorly
calibrated to the small claims at stake in many instances.
Thus, for that part of the problem that bears on enforcement of constraints
against multiple small individuals (“elephant vs. gnats”), a privication framework
might be a preferable recipe.  If the cost of piracy can be increased through
significant barriers to breaking a technical architecture that prevents it, rather
than a calculus combining the likelihood of being caught with the severity of
punishment, control might be more efficiently effected.  Put another way: an
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure; few banks would prefer a solved
robbery to a vault never robbed.
D. “Newtonian” motion: the inertia of trusted systems’s constraints.
A well-constructed trusted system could, once established, maintain its
constraints comparatively more cheaply and with less government cooperation
than those defined and enforced through a legal regime.
A trusted system could be cheaper because, apart from the fixed costs of
designing and deploying it, there are low ongoing costs to its maintenance.  This
is true in the simple sense that software does not wilt after repeated uses, and if
its function is to produce sophisticated gates around information, it can continue
to staff them without the annuities necessary for human guards.  Trusted
systems upstage most of law’s enforcement mechanisms, dependent as they are
on attorneys general, courts, or legislatures.STANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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Moreover, networked technologies can attain a self-perpetuating momentum;
once in place they can be quite difficult to uproot.
73  A system intertwining
suppliers and consumers exhibits just these network externalities.
The power of market-based network effects reduces the need for continued
government backing of the constraint scheme embedded within the network.  To
be sure, the language used to map out the components and features of a trusted
system is the language of law—rights, ownership.  These words capture their
technical functions while remaining somewhat true to their legal etymology: as
with traditional legal rights, they represent the constraints that some users can
place on others, constraints from which those others may not readily deviate.
Unlike traditional legal rights, however, the constraints designed into most trusted
systems—and then invoked by one user against another—are not themselves
74  Even in the publishing context they are not like
copyright, for no legislature defined them, and no court interprets them.  They are
not like contract, because the assistance of the state is not needed to validate
and enforce their terms.
75  They can be at once highly effective and highly
independent of government intercession.
76
                                                   
73 See generally Brian W. Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 Scientific American 92
(1990); Paul David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 American Economic Review, 332
(1985); Mark Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java Change Everything?, 520 PLI/Pat 453
(1998).
74 A “legally protected interest” is a right that is coupled with a duty on other parties not to infringe
that right. It is more than a right, in the sense that the courts will use their power to stop the
interference with the right. See Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical
Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 975, 986-89.
75 Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace at 136 (“But contracts are not as bad
as code.  Contracts are a form of law.  If a term of a contract is inconsistent with a value of
copyright law, you can refuse to obey it and let the other side get a court to enforce it.  The
ultimate power of a contract is a decision by a court—to enforce the contract or not.   Although
courts today are relatively eager to find ways to enforce these contracts, there is at least hope
that if the other side makes its case very clear, courts could shift direction again.STANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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This may be an easy feature to miss when reflecting upon the publishing
industries’ intended use of trusted systems, given how little trouble they have had
marshaling government support for ongoing rule-and-sanction protection.  Still,
even a politically advantaged stakeholder would, all else being equal,
presumably wish to rely as little as possible on the possibly fickle solicitousness
of the public arena towards its interests.
E. Opportunity for new rights constructs.
The story of trusted systems for publishing so far looks to be one of winner-
take-all: the designers of the system tilt each of the features just described to
their maximum advantage.  In the case of the music industry, we might say that
the trustee is computer technology and the companies behind it, and the trusters
are ASCAP and BMI.  After a rocky start, they are collaborating to ensure that
music listeners enjoy their products on the basis of something other than the
honor code or the legal code.  The untrusted is the public: computer owners at
large who might ask their computers to do more with content than the originator
of the content would like.
If publishers in a world of trusted privication do not need copyright's
protections, its countervailing privileges—already weak—need not be
                                                                                                                                                        
   The same is not true of code…Again—where to do we challenge code?  When the
software protects in a particular way without relying in the end on the state, where can we
challenge the nature of the protection?  Where can we demand balance when the code takes it
away?”).
76 Yochai Benkler, invoking work on “negative liberty,” illustrates this distinction quite neatly by
pointing out the difference between being “able” to write (or copy) something and being “free” to
do so.  Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
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respected.
77  Fair use is merely a defense against a claim of copyright
infringement; it is not a “right” that one can affirmatively exercise to claim access
to data or an ability to copy it.  Within the “Trusted Privication” framework, the
law’s sanctions and exceptions are equally irrelevant, and the issue is only
whether the act of copying can be made technically nontrivial.
78
Because the music industry—the supplier of content—is the predominant
force establishing a system of privication, the rights architecture the system
reflects might inevitably appear lopsided to consumers of content.  This
                                                   
77 See Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace at 472; Mark Gimbel, Some Thoughts on the Implications
of Trusted Systems for Intellectual Property Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1671 (1998).
78 Analysis of the implications of privication is in its early stages, and no one has yet come up with
a thorough theoretical framework to enforce, say, fair use as some sort of “copyduty” right rather
than a mere defensive privilege, perhaps expressed as a limitation on what kinds of trusted
systems can be deployed.  See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously, 28 Conn. L. Rev.
981 (1996) 985, (“As justification for the development of digital copyright management systems,
copyright owners cite the ease of reproducing and transmitting unauthorized copies of digital
works over electronic networks. They argue that technological protection for their works is
necessary to prevent widespread infringement, thus giving them the incentive to make their works
available online. As the above example suggests however, many copyright owners envision
copyright management systems that will be capable of doing far more than simply preventing
unauthorized reproduction. One study of existing technologies for copyright management
characterizes the ideal technology as "capable of detecting, preventing, and counting a wide
range of operations, including open, print, export, copying, modifying, excerpting, and so
on."…This vision of the future of copyright management could entail total loss of reader
anonymity in cyberspace…It could also entail the demise of the fair use doctrine…However, that
is a subject for another article.”); Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace at 137
(“The loss of fair use is a consequence of the perfection of trusted systems.  Whether you
consider it a problem or not depends on your view of the value of fair use.  If you consider it a
public value that should exist regardless of the the technological regime, then the emergence of
this perfection should trouble you.  From your perspective, there was a value latent in the
imperfection of the old system that has now been erased.”); William W. Fisher III, Property and
Contract on the Internet, 73 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 1203, 1254 (1998) (raising possibility of
Congressional authorizing some private intellectual property protection technologies while
banning others); Gimbel at 1685-87 (1998) (going so far as to call trusted systems “an invitation
to consider whether private ordering is appropriate in the context of intellectual property”); Glenn
O. Brown, Copyduty: Saving Fair Use in the Coming Era of "Privacation," Student Papers,
Seminar on Internet and Society, Harvard Law School, Jan. 1999, available at
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/is98/final_papers/Brown.html> (exploring the feasibility of
implementing a regime of “copyduty,” under which fair use would become an affirmative right
rather than affirmative defense) (hereinafter, Copyduty); Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use:
The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C.L. Rev.
557, (January, 1998); DanThu Thi Phan, Will Fair Use Function on the Internet, 98 Colum. L.STANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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lopsidedness may first appear as simply hyperenforcement of existing intellectual
property law.
However, trusted systems and “privication” are not merely about enforcement,
and they need not be lopsided.  Indeed, they offer opportunities to create new
distributions of constraint and freedom among consumer and producer, ones that
need not reflect substantively extreme allocations to one or the other.  The quite
basic trusted system of a taxicab meter enforces a rule on fare calculation, but it
also calculates a fare on the basis of subtle combinations of the distance covered
and time spent stopped in traffic in a way that driver and passenger simply could
not—a new, perhaps “fairer” accounting of what a passenger owes a driver than
what a glance at an odometer or reliance on a crude geographic “zone” system
could provide.
Some implementations of a trusted system could help better reconcile the
conflicting interests of consumers in listening to cheap music (and exchanging
ideas and speech with one another) with a level of control over work that would
satisfy the music industry.  For example, one could imagine allowing “fair use” of
music so long as it was not at full digital quality—for example, one could listen
freely to songs at AM radio quality, while having to pay to hear them at full
fidelity.  This might or might not make economic sense to the industry, but in any
case it could advance the sort of social policies that underlie fair use by allowing
everyone, rich or poor, to benefit from listening to music, without endangering the
market for music among those who wish to pay for it.  A trusted system might
                                                                                                                                                        
Rev. 169, (January, 1998). Given the trajectory of copyright law’s evolution, one might predict that
a proposal advancing a copyduty right would not be very welcome in Congress.STANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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provide that elementary school music teachers could play music for their
students in the classroom for free, without worry that the students—or teacher—
could then take the music home or resell it to others not at school.  There could
be corresponding new forms of “fair use” for books, articles, speeches, and
newspapers.  Control might be tightened in some areas, loosened in others.
Unless market forces demand them, these “moderate” systems are unlikely to
arise in publishing, at least as long as the industry is building the system and
Congress sees no reason to intervene on behalf of the public interest.  But these
sorts of new balancing constructs may prove quite important for privacy, where
privacy advocates are among the least advantaged at the table of public choice.
IV. Medical data: A Trajectory of Personal Privacy Worries—
and Responses to Them—in a Digitally Networked
Environment
A. A New Problem: Quick, cheap, perfect copies
Sun Microsystems’s Scott McNealy laid down the gauntlet to those who care
about privacy in the spring of 1999.  His observation was pithier than Barlow’s
declaration to the information industries,
79 if less lyrical:
                                                   
79John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (visited Nov. 27, 1999)
<http://www.eff.org/pub/Misc/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/barlow_0296.declaration> (“Your
increasingly obsolete information industries would perpetuate themselves by proposing laws, in
America and elsewhere, that claim to own speech itself throughout the world. These laws would
declare ideas to be another industrial product, no more noble than pig iron. In our world, whateverSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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“You already have zero privacy.  Get over it.”
80
The elements of the information technology revolution that worry intellectual
property holders carry parallel significance for individuals as personal data
holders.
81  After all, whether for profit or dignity, at the core each group desires
the same end: control over information.  There is, however, a fundamental
shifting of roles.  In the context of intellectual property, worry has come largely
from well-organized corporate interests seeking protection against death by a
thousand cuts from “little guy” information pirates.  With privacy, worry has come
largely from individuals seeking protection against a whittling away of privacy by
well-organized corporate interests.
82
                                                                                                                                                        
the human mind may create can be reproduced and distributed infinitely at no cost. The global
conveyance of thought no longer requires your factories to accomplish”).
80 See Edward C. Baig et al., Privacy: The Internet Wants Your Personal Info. What's in It for
You?, BUSINESS WEEK, Apr. 5, 1999, at 84.
81 See Jonathan P. Cody, Protecting Privacy Over the Internet: Has the Time Come to Abandon
Self-Regulation?, 48 Cath. U.L. Rev. 1183, (1999) (“Fueling online individual privacy concerns is
the fact that the collection and use of personal identifiable information have never been cheaper
or easier than in the online environment.”);  Laurie J Flynn, Privacy Groups 'Honor' Some
Institutional Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1999 (describing a mock awards ceremony for notable
violations of privacy held at the Computers, Freedom and Privacy Conference); Anne Meredith
Fulton, Cyberspace and the Internet: Who Will Be the Privacy Police?, 3 Comm. Law Conspectus
63 (1994) (“The very anonymous nature of the Internet . . . has as much potential for private and
governmental abuse as a masked burglar, a con artist, a hooded night rider, or a dossier
collecting zealot. The paradox is that in order to protect privacy, anonymity must be limited.”);
Paul Taylor, Fears rise over personal privacy: The vast amount of data on the information
superhighway is causing concern about the 'Big Brother' age in which we live, LONDON FINANCIAL
TIMES Feb. 4, 1998, at 1 (stating that privacy advocates have “grown so concerned about the
sheer volume of data that is now collected about individuals over the internet - much of it
available at a price to others - that they are now calling for new a tougher legislation to control the
activities of modern-day marketers”).
82 See Adam L. Penenberg, The End of Privacy: Our reporter dared a private eye to dig up dirt on
him. The results are  terrifying to anybody who worries about prying eyes or credit card
scamsters. What can you do to protect yourself? FORBES NOV. 29, 1999 at 182; Ann Harrison,
Early RealNetworks  Slapped With Privacy Lawsuits, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 15, 1999 at 20;
Jane Birnbaum, Here's  How To Protect Your Medical  Records, CHICAGO TRIBUNE Nov. 23, 1999
at 1; James Lardner, Every click you make . . . Shopping online at the office? Your boss may be
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More than one commentator has lamented that video rentals are treated to
more emphatic federal protection than medical data.
83  This is so despite the
rapid digitization of sensitive medical records,
84 a marked increase in the amount
of information of which a “medical record” now comprises,
85 and a number of
“scare stories” about misuse of medical data.
86
                                                   
83 See Helena Gail Rubinstein, If I Am Only for Myself, What Am I?: A Communitarian Look at the
Privacy Stalemate, 25 Am. J. L. And Med. 203, 203 (1999);  See note 137, supra on the Video
Privacy Protection Act for a full description.
84 There are several public companies (such as McKesson HBOC, Inc. and IDX Systems
Corporation) that provide enterprise IT solutions to healthcare providers, which include electronic
medical records management functionalities.  Their systems typically do not allow access via the
Internet.  A provider of client/server medical record management software, MedicaLogic, Inc., has
recently developed an Internet-based medical record management application and has filed for
an IPO.  Major Internet healthcare companies, including drkoop.com, Inc. are also developing
Internet medical record management functionalities as part of their offerings.  See
<http://www.drkoop.com/aboutus/products/pmrtour/one.html> (visited Nov. 28, 1999).  Numerous
startups (MedicalRecord.com and others) have also been trying to enter this market.
85 See Jurevic, at 809-810 (detailing the type of information in a medical record).
86 See, e.g., Barb Albert, Patients' medical records inadvertently posted on Net, THE INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, March 30, 1999, at A1 (describing how the “intimate details of some 90 patients' sex lives,
along with their names, addresses, phone numbers and credit card numbers, were exposed on
the Internet,” unbeknownst even to their pychiatrist); Marilyn Chase, Medical records may be
private but they're hardly confidential, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 11, 1996, at A26
(“Many people experience unsettling leaks to an employer or the general public about their
personal medical information that can be small or life-shattering. It can be something as simple
but annoying as having notice of your child's birth given to marketers who release a hail of junk
mail promoting baby gear. Or it can be as significant as your company management learning
about your past therapy for alcohol abuse.”); Douglas Fisher, Hippocratic Oath for the Information
Age, THE TORONTO SUN, July 29, 1998, at 17 (expressing concern over medical privacy in the
digital context and labeling “scary” what the privatization of previously government-run services
”has been doing to threaten individuals' privacy”);  Jodi Upton, U-M medical records end up on
Web: Patients fear privacy was hurt from mistaken release of names, Social Security numbers,
THE DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 12, 1999 (“Thousands of University of Michigan health system patients
had personal and medical information released over the Internet without knowing it, hospital
officials said Thursday.”); Elizabeth Weise & M.J. Zuckerman, Balancing acts: Privacy Rights,
Internet Access USA TODAY, Apr. 8, 1999, at 5D (“Americans are increasingly aware of the need
to avoid ‘a privacy meltdown of Chernobyl-like proportions,’ Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass., said
in his keynote address” at the Computers, Freedom, & Privacy Conference in Washington, D.C.);
M.J. Zuckerman, As information flies, privacy could be dead on arrival, USA TODAY, July 14,
1999, at 4D (“In many instances, sensitive information is being volunteered in . . . inappropriate
settings, such as chat rooms and Web pages where patients seek advice or share experiences.”);
Safeguards on privacy must be tighter THE KANSAS CITY STAR, Nov. 3, 1999, at B8 (“For
Americans who don't like the idea of having their private medical records opened to
indiscriminate scrutiny by curious strangers and companies, one of the most disappointing
congressional failures in recent years has been in medical privacy. . . . The abuse of these
records can come from unethical health-care organizations, misguided employers and potential
employers, sleazy marketing operations and - last but certainly not least - free-lance Peeping
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B. Solution 1.0: Strengthening medical data privacy rights
Understanding just what is meant by rights over intellectual property is made
easier by the existence of Title 17 in the United States and its respective siblings
elsewhere.
87  The most politically important sticks within the bundle of rights
amounting to “copyright ownership” are specifically and carefully elaborated
there,
88 along with generally much vaguer exceptions and reservations.
89  They
perhaps have both reflected and perpetuated cultural norms—adjusted for the
political weight of various interests—about ownership of one’s tangible creative
output.
The status quo for privacy has been significantly murkier.  The term has taken
on varied meanings within and near the general “right to be let alone,”
90 ranging
from freedom from humiliating government searches and intrusions
91 to freedom
to make personal choices free of government interference,
92 to abilities to control
                                                   
87 See 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq.; Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 (United Kingdom);
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act, 1971); Universal
Copyright Convention (195); Melville B. Nimmer & Paul E. Geller, International Copyright Law and
Practice, § 3 (1988-94); Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors  And Users In Copyright, 45 J. Copyright
Soc'y U.S.A. 1,  Fall, 1997.
88 See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
89 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-112.  See generally, William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use
Doctrine, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1661 (1988).
90 See Samuel Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
91 See Michael Adler, Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital Contraband: the Fourth
Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 Yale L.J. 1093 (1996).
92 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479  (1965);  John
Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920, 930 (1973).STANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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facts (or even falsehoods) linked to oneself.
93  Jerry Kang, in a comprehensive
survey of information privacy, reviews these varied definitions and applications,
honing in on a distinct meaning of information privacy that triangulates among a
scatterplot of sources.
94  Major areas of concern include the transfer of one’s
personal information by another party to a third for marketing purposes, the
publication of embarrassing private personal data, and the use of sensitive
personal data by employers and insurance companies in making decisions that
might bear heavily on one’s economic well-being.
95
Even if we limit our view of privacy to information privacy, however, there is
simply no protection as fully developed in law as Title 17 is for copyright.  The
information revolution encountered a legal patchwork of information privacy rights
that, by any account, is only fitfully mapped out.
96  There are many places where
                                                   
93 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); see
also William J. Feinrich, Common Law Protection of Individuals’ Rights in Personal Information,
65 Fordham L. Rev. 951(1996).
94 See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1193
(1998).
95 See, e.g., Paul Taylor, Fears rise over personal privacy, supra note 76 (describing consumer
fears that personal information will be sold to third parties without the consumer’s knowledge);
Barb Albert, Patients' medical records inadvertently posted on Net, infra note 115 (describing an
incident in which over 90 sex therapy patients’ intimate data was posted on the Internet);  Marilyn
Chase, Medical records may be private but they're hardly confidential, infra note 115 (describing
various ways in which embarrassing information might be distributed on the Internet); David
Orenstein, High Standard in Works for  Sharing E-Customer Data Ability to easily share
information  alarms privacy experts, despite  planned guidelines, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 22,1999
at 2; Lawrence  M. O'Rourke, News Phone line may be private, but are your records?, NEWS &
OBSERVER, NOV. 7, 1999 AT A1; Richard A Epstein, Privacy, please, NAT'L REVIEW, Sept, 27, 1999
at 46; John Schwartz, IRS Looks to E-Mail as a  Tool; Plan to Send Tax Data to Lenders Raises
Privacy Concerns, WASHINGTON POST FINANCIAL, Oct. 23, 1999, at E01;  Milt Freudenheim,
Medicine at the Click of a Mouse; On-Line Health Files Are Convenient. Are They Private? N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1998.
96 See Erika S. Koster, Zero Privacy:  Personal Data On The Internet  5 Computer Law. 7 May,
1999  at 9; Jerry Kang, Cyberspace  Privacy: A Primer And  Proposal, 26 Hum. Rts. 3 (Winter,
1999) at 4.  There is also much less harmonization of private sector privacy law internationally,
especially compared with international intellectual property convention, see n. 7 supra.  The
European Union has adopted a directive mandating that member nations adopt a framework of
privacy rights for personal information; no comparable rights exist in U.S. federal law.  See
Jennifer M. Myers, Creating Data Protection Legislation in the United States: An Examination ofSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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the U.S. Code defines personal information privacy rights vis-à-vis government
intrusion.
97  The legislation that is arguably most comprehensive—the Privacy
Act of 1974
98—might have become the “Title 17” of privacy had its proscriptions
applied against private actors, as the report from which it drew many of its
features recommended.
99
                                                                                                                                                        
Current Legislation in the European Union, Span, and the United States, 29 Case W. Res. J. Int’l
L. 109 (1997).
97 Some examples are: Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 ("VPPA") (18 U.S.C. 2710 (1988)).
The VPPA was enacted in response to the revelation, at the Supreme Court nomination hearings
of Judge Bork, that a list of his video tape rentals had been procured and made publicly available.
The VPPA prohibits video stores from giving third parties information about a customer's rentals
or sales. However, mailing lists of customer addresses can be distributed under the VPPA. (18
U.S.C. 2710-2711); The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, (47 U.S.C. 551 (1988)) which
forbids cable operators and third parties from monitoring the viewing habits of subscribers.
(551(c)(2)(C)(ii)(I)); The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA) governs the information
practices of consumer reporting agencies, such as credit bureaus, and the use of consumer
reports and the sharing of affiliate information within bank holding companies and other
multicompany organizations. See 15 U.S.C.A. 1681-1681u (West Supp. 1998); The Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 was enacted as a direct response to the Miller decision, and
established notice and access procedures for access to financial information by federal
government agencies. See 12 U.S.C.A. 3401-3422 (West Supp. 1998); The Electronic Fund
Transfer Act of 1978 provides a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and
responsibilities of parties with respect to electronic fund transfers. Its primary objective is to
protect the rights of individuals in such transfers. It also requires notice of the circumstances
when account information will regularly be disclosed to third parties. See 15 U.S.C.A. 1693-1693r
(West 1997); The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, as amended by The Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, restricts the collection, use and
disclosure of information relating to cable systems. See 47 U.S.C.A. 551 (West Supp. 1998).
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 is intended to protect against unauthorized
interception of electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C.A. 2510-2522 (West Supp. 1998). The
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 made it a federal crime to "knowingly" access certain
computer systems and obtain information without authorization. The intent of Congress was to
proscribe intentional acts of unauthorized access and focus federal criminal prosecutions on
individuals whose conduct evidenced a clear intent to enter, without proper authorization,
computer files or data belonging to a financial institution. Id. 1030. The Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991 was created to govern telephone solicitations and give the Federal
Communications Commission the rulemaking authority to prescribe regulations necessary to
protect residential subscribers' privacy by avoiding telephone solicitations to which they object.
See 47 U.S.C.A. 227 (West Supp. 1998). The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of
1998 amended the federal criminal code to make it a crime for a person to knowingly transfer or
use, without lawful authority, a means of identification of any other person with the intent to
commit, aid or abet any unlawful activity that violates federal law. See Pub. L. No. 105-318 , 1998
U.S.C.C.A.N. (112 Stat.) 3007 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. 1028).
98 See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C Section 522(a)
99 See U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welfare, Report of the Secretary’s Advisory
Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems (1973) at xxiii (recommending that individuals
be given rights to their own information so that they could take action to protect that information);
Priscilla M. Regan, Legislating Privacy, (UNC Press, 1995) (The “bill was comprehensive in itsSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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There are federal laws covering the handling of highly specific and especially
sensitive types of collections of personal data in private hands.
100  These include
laws governing handling of video rental information,
101 cable subscriber channel
preference data,
102 the contents of telephone calls (both landline and cellular),
103
credit reports,
104 financial transactions,
105 and electronic communications
generally.
106
At the state level, some constitutions provide generalized rights of privacy
supplemented by interpretive cases,
107 statutes carve out particular privacy
interests,
108 and at common law there are threads of tort that have developed for
                                                                                                                                                        
scope, covering all automated and manual personal information systems in federal, state, and
local governments as well as the private sector…The compromise bill reflected more of the
original House bill in that it covered only federal agencies.”)
100 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private
Sector, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 497 (1995); Driver Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. 2721
(1994).
101 See Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 et. seq.
102 See Cable TV Privacy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551.
103 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.
104 See Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §1681 et seq. (defining the type of consumer
information that may be kept, fair practices for disclosure of that information, and remedies for
individuals).
105 See Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. 3401 et seq. (The Right to Financial Privacy Act
was Congress' response to a U.S. Supreme Court decision that found bank customers had no
legal right of privacy for their financial information held by financial institutions. The law is largely
procedural and requires government agencies to provide notice and an opportunity to object
before a bank or other institution can disclose personal financial information to a government
agency, usually for law enforcement purposes. The law was amended in the latter 1980s to allow
postponement of notice in investigations dealing with drug trafficking and espionage)
106 See ECPA, 18 U.S.C. 2510 et. seq.
107 See ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 12; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; ALASKA
CONST. art. I, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; HAW. CONST. art. I
§§ 6, 7; FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 23; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; ARIZ. CONST. art II, § 8;
Timothy O. Lenz, "Rights Talk" About Privacy In State Courts, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 1613 (1997);
Privacy Rights in State Constitutions: Models for Illinois? 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 215.
108 See, e.g.  Cal. Penal Code § 637.6 (West Supp. 1991) (protecting personal data gathered by
those in the business of organizing car pools); N.J.Stat. Ann. 17:16K-3 (West 1984) (a New
Jersey statute permits the disclosure of information relating to electronic fund); Cal. Civ. Code
1748.12 (West 1998) (Cal restricts the disclosure of certain credit card information); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit.9-A, 8-304 (West 1997).  See also, Robert M. Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: The
Uncertain Role Of The Physician In The Protection Of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C.L. Rev. 255 (1984)
(“There is tremendous variation in the number and quality of state laws on medical confidentiality.
A 1979 review by the National Commission on Confidentiality of Health Records (NCCHR) ofSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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misuse of personal information since Warren and Brandeis’s famous call for such
actions over a century ago.
109
Without weighing in on the comparative substantive importance—either to the
principals involved or to society generally—of enabling control over respective
types of information, a coarse comparison of the intellectual property and privacy
protection regimes suggests that the former was and is more securely protected
under law.
This differential is even more striking when the transposition of parties is
taken into account between the two areas.  Intellectual property stakeholders
have a direct economic calculus by which to measure and justify the amount of
protection to insist upon, whether through private causes of action
110 under
expanding copyright law,
111 enforcement of contracts that bear on control,
112 or
funding the development and deployment of technological self-help schemes.
113
As noted earlier, some of the most prominent stakeholders are themselves
collective organizations that can apply economies of scale in the processes of
                                                                                                                                                        
laws on the maintenance, use, and disclosure of personally identified patient information found
that Vermont had seven such laws, but that Hawaii had thirty-nine”); Joy Pritts, Janlori Goldman,
Zoe Hudson, Aimee Berenson, and Elizabeth Hadley, The State of Health Privacy: An Uneven
Terrain/A Comprehensive Survey of State Health Privacy Statutes, Health Privacy Project, July
1999, (visited Nov. 28, 1999) <http://www.healthprivacy.org/resources/statereports/keyfind.html>
(describing the extent and variation between states protections of health information).
109 See  Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy;  William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev.
383 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 652A-652E (1977).  For a more recent overview
with attention to information technology, For a more recent overview with attention to information
technology, see Jonathan P. Graham, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of
Personal Information, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1395 (1987); see generally  William J. Fenrich, Common
Law Protection of Individual’s Rights in Personal Information, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 951 (1996).
110 17 U.S.C. 501-505;17 U.S.C.S. § 501(b) (1999).
111 See text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
112 See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra.
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expanding and defending the reach of intellectual property rights, including the
investigation and prosecution of particular infringements.
114
                                                   
114 See American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (visited Nov. 28, 1999)
<http://www.ascap.com> (home page), (visited Nov. 28, 1999)
<http://www.ascap.com/about/about.html> (about ASCAP) (“ASCAP is the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers, a membership association of over 80,000 composers,
songwriters, lyricists and music publishers. ASCAP's function is to protect the rights of its
members by licensing and paying royalties for the public performances of their copyrighted
works”); Recording Industry Association of America (visited Nov. 28, 1999)
<http://www.riaa.com/about/aboutus.htm> (about RIAA) <http://www.riaa.com/> (home page)
(“The Recording Industry Association of America is the trade group for the recorded music you
enjoy every day. Our members are the companies that comprise the most vibrant national music
industry in the world. Our mission is to foster a business and legal climate that supports and
promotes our members' creative and financial vitality around the world”); Software Publisher’s
Association and Software & Information Industry Association (visited Nov. 28, 1999)
<http://www.siia.net/> (home page) (visited Nov. 28, 1999)
<http://www.siia.net/piracy/programs/backgrounder.htm> (SPA anti-piracy mission statement)
(“The Software & Information Industry Association's SPA Anti-Piracy Division conducts a
comprehensive, industry-wide campaign to fight software piracy. The pro-active campaign is
premised on the notion that one must balance enforcement with education in order to be
effective. The campaign has two broad charters: educate users about the copyright law and
provide them with information necessary to comply with it, and Enforce members' copyrights and
trademarks. SPA Anti-Piracy's efforts are conducted on behalf of any SIIA member who wants to
be involved. Currently, over 90 percent of SIIA member companies are involved in the anti-piracy
campaign. The campaign is successful because organizations that pirate software steal from all
software publishers, not just one or two. This makes SIIA's SPA Anti-Piracy program very
valuable as organizations are required to "come clean" on all member software. The program
began in 1985 under the direction of the Software Publishers Association (SPA) which merged
with the Information Industry Association in January 1999 to form the Software & Information
Industry Association (SIIA)”); Association of American Publishers, (visited Nov. 28, 1999)
<http://www.publishers.org/2.htm> (home page) (visited Nov. 28, 1999)
<http://www.publishers.org/home/issues/index.htm#copyright> (copyright page) (“Publishers in
the United States and worldwide are facing enormous challenges in the area of intellectual
property protection. Securing copyrighted works against unauthorized use in print and electronic
format, in the domestic and international marketplace; protecting the integrity of copyrighted
works in the digital environment; tracking the use of these works; and developing workable
compensation mechanisms are essential if the industry is going to survive and grow. The AAP is
devoting significant resources to meeting this challenge”); Broadcast Music, Inc., home page
(visited Nov. 28, 1999) <http://bmi.com/>; Motion Picture Association of America, home page
(visited Nov. 28, 1999) <http://www.mpaa.org/> (visited Nov. 28, 1999)
<http://www.mpaa.org/about/> (about MPAA) (“The Motion Picture Association of America
(MPAA) and its international counterpart, the Motion Picture Association (MPA) serve as the
voice and advocate of the American motion picture, home video and television industries,
domestically through the MPAA and internationally through the MPA”); National Music Publisher’s
Association, home page (visited Nov. 28, 1999) <http://www.nmpa.org/>  (visited Nov. 28, 1999)
<http://www.nmpa.org/nmpa.html> (about NMPA) (“Since 1917, NMPA has been a strong and
effective champion for the protection of music copyrights in an age of rapid technological
changes. NMPA was a leading voice for music publishers in connection with the enactment of the
Copyright Act of 1976, and has successfully advocated amendments to that Act where necessary
to protect the interests of music copyright owners”); Songwriter’s Guild of America, home page,
(visited Nov. 28, 1999) <http://www.songwriters.org/>; see also Recording Indus. Ass'n v.
Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc 180 F.3d 1072, 1999 WL 387265 (9th Cir. 1999).STANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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The privacy-seeking individual is, by contrast, far less well equipped to assert
her information “rights.”
115  The Federal Trade Commission can rarely take on
individual privacy violations alleged to rise to the level of unfair trade practices,
focusing instead on violations that seem widespread and systematic.
116  For an
individual to bring a lawsuit for, say, invasion of a common law right such as that
against “misappropriation of personal data,”
117 is simply not as easy as it is for a
record company to pursue a pirate; the nature of the right makes for a less
mechanical cause of action, and the aggrieved plaintiff may be fighting for dignity
more than any likely remuneration.
118  As for contract rights, alleged invaders of
privacy may not have contractual privity with invadees, and where privity exists
                                                   
115 See e.g., Patricia I. Carter, Health Information Privacy: Can Congress Protect Confidential
Medical Information in the “Information Age?” 25 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 223 (1999)  (“Right now,
the way we currently protect the privacy of our medical records is erratic at best--dangerous at
worst. It is time for our nation to enact federal legislation to protect the age-old right to privacy in
this new world of progress.’" and “…[T]he current complex patchwork of federal and state
protections is insufficient in this age of information technology. Comprehensive federal legislation
will be required to meet the challenge of maintaining the confidentiality of individually- identifiable
medical information, while still making appropriate information available for necessary and
valuable public uses.”); Scott Burris, Healthcare Privacy & Confidentiality: The Complete Legal
Guide, 16 J. Legal Med 447, 451 (1995) ("the only reasonable expectation of privacy is no
expectation of privacy at all.") (reviewing Jonathan P. Tomes, Healthcare Privacy &
Confidentiality: The Complete Legal Guide (1994)). ("Privacy doctrine today is largely devoted to
perpetuating a myth--a myth of "privacy rights' in which autonomous individuals are capable of
exercising actual control over information that is to be found in the minds or papers of identifiable
individuals.") Id.
116 See Federal Trade Commission, Where to Go for More Information, (visited Nov. 29, 1999)
<http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/moreinfo.htm> (“Letters from consumers are very important to the work of
the FTC. They are often the first indication of a problem in the marketplace and may provide the
initial evidence to begin an investigation. If you have a consumer problem or complaint, write to
the Federal Trade Commission. Although the agency cannot act to resolve individual problems, it
can act when it sees a pattern of possible law violations develop.")
117 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 652A-652E (1977); Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy.
118 See Avrahami v. U.S. News & World Rep., Inc., No. 96-203, slip op. (Cir. Ct. Arlington County
June 13, 1996), cited in William J. Fenrich, Common Law Protection of Individual’s Rights in
Personal Information, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 951 (1996) (in which plaintiff objected to defendant’s
selling of his name and address to a third party for marketing purposes, losing because he had
intentionally misspelled his name in order to track its sale); Scott Shorr, Personal Information
Contracts: How to Protect Privacy Without Violating the First Amendment, 80 Cornell L. Rev.
1756 (1995) (“As applied by the courts, none of these torts offers more than minimal assistanceSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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the “little guy” worried about privacy may be the weaker party in the contract,
unable ex ante to readily negotiate, afford, or even rationally account for privacy
protection that truly reflects his or her preferences, particularly when the use of
personal information is ancillary to the transaction in question.
119  For example,
few people would be in a position to dwell upon what will happen to data about
their car rental as they present their drivers’ licenses, sign a few forms, and pick
up their keys.
120
The interests that are well organized to protect copyright are among the
commercial interests who fight any movement towards strong privacy legislation,
fearing it will interfere with personalized marketing efforts.  Indeed, the very
music and technology industries that are building structures to defend their
control over artistic data are building personal data collection and use
mechanisms into those structures.
121  This may explain why the few existing
explicit federal privacy protections are as narrow as the exceptions to copyright in
                                                                                                                                                        
to a consumer who claims that a credit bureau’s collection or disclosure of personal information
119 Consumers are clearly ambivalent in their views about privacy.  On one hand there is ample
data demonstrating intense concern; compare Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace
Transactions, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1193, 1196-98 (1998) (discussing various surveys, each eliciting
strong and increasing consumer concern for personal privacy, and describing public outrage upon
discovery of certain personal information-selling practices);  with  Katie Hafner, Do You Know
Who’s Watching You?  Do You Care?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1999, at G1 (“Most Americans … are
willing to part with personal information as long as they get something in return, and as long as
they know what is to be done with the information. They are happy to carry supermarket discount
cards. They are annoyed when they get new computers and must re-enter all the information
needed for one-click ordering at Amazon.com.”).  However, Hafner does note that “[t]hese same
people, however, are highly protective of their medical records and are generally appalled when
they learn of clandestine data collection practices.” Id.
120 But cf. Shorr, n. 118 infra, expressing confidence in a privacy contracting regime at least for
credit bureau data. (“[A]n alternative legal regime grounded in property and contract law can
protect privacy from credit bureau invasions without unreasonably infringing free commercial
speech.”)
121 See Ann Harrison, RealNetworks Slapped with Privacy Lawsuits; Hilary Rosen (President &
CEO,Recording Industry Association of America), Testimony, House of RepresentativesSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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the Fair Music Licensing Act; some were passed in response to specific privacy
“crises,” and they all faced intense lobbying to narrow their scope before passage
and intense litigation to cabin their scope after passage.  For example, the 1994
Drivers Privacy Protection Act was passed only in response to the stalking of
Rebecca Schaefer, a well-known actress; it remains the subject of litigation.
122
The Video Rental Act was passed after the release of Judge Robert Bork’s video
rental information during confirmation hearings on his nomination to the Supreme
Court; before passage, the measure was trimmed back to ensure that video
rental stores could still sell customer lists.
123  The Privacy Act is credited to
Watergate, and as mentioned the private sector was exempted from its
proscriptions after industry weighed in.
124  In essence: rational, profit-maximizing
industry quite naturally works to maintain a legal framework through which it can
control its own information while trafficking freely in the information of individuals.
Whatever privacy’s value or popularity as an abstract concept, attempts to
legislate it are met with stiff resistance far more organized than the forward
momentum generated by individuals who covet it.
125
                                                                                                                                                        
Commerce Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection, October 28, 1999, 1999 WL
988372 (F.D.C.H.)
122 See Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 ("DPPA") (Pub. L. No. 103-322,108 Stat. 1766,
2099-2102 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725) (1994)); Thomas H. Odom, Gregory S. Feder,
Challenging the Federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act: The Next Step in Developing a
Jurisprudence of Process-Oriented Federalism Under the Tenth Amendment, 53 U. Miami L.
Rev. 71, n. 2 (1998); Jane E. Kirtley, Data Protection Law and the European Union's Directive:
the challenge for the united states the EU data protection directive and the first amendment: why
a "press exemption" won't work, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 639.
123 See Regan, at 207.
124 See Regan, cf 139.
125 For a thorough treatment of this phenomenon, see Priscilla M. Regan, Legislating Privacy:
Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy (University of North Carolina Press: 1995) at 181-
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Whatever the difficulties of using existing legal tools to solve privacy
problems, privacy advocates have had little else in their arsenal to combat the
loss of privacy brought on by the information revolution.  Federal legislation to
protect medical information has been repeatedly proposed.
126  To date, none has
passed,
127 though many states have relevant statutes in place.
128
Congress formally punted on the issue in 1996 when it passed the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
129  The Act’s “administrative
simplification” provisions were intended to assist the health care industry in
standardizing electronic formats for medical records, ultimately by having the
government mandate certain technical standards derived from the private
sector.
130  Some standards have already been generated through this process.
131
                                                   
126 Proposed medical privacy legislation includes: Federal Privacy of Medical Information Act
(H.R. 5935) (1977); Fair Health Information Practices Act of 1994 (H.R. 4077); Health Security
Act (H.R. 3600) (1993-94); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996; Health
Care Personal Information Nondisclosure Act of 1998 (S. 1921); and the Consumer Protection
and Medical Record Confidentiality Act of 1998. See Regan at 105-106. Medical Records
Confidentiality Act of 1995, S. 1360, 104th Cong., 1st Sess (1995); See Judith Beth Prowda, A
Lawyer’s Ramble Down the Information Superhighway: Privacy and Security of Data, 64 Fordham
L. Rev. 738 (1995).
127 Id at 755.
128 Robert M. Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain Role Of The Physician In The
Protection Of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C.L. Rev. 255 (1984) (“There is tremendous variation in the
number and quality of state laws on medical confidentiality. A 1979 review by the National
Commission on Confidentiality of Health Records (NCCHR) of laws on the maintenance, use, and
disclosure of personally identified patient information found that Vermont had seven such laws,
but that Hawaii had thirty-nine”); Joy Pritts, Janlori Goldman, Zoe Hudson, Aimee Berenson, and
Elizabeth Hadley, The State of Health Privacy: An Uneven Terrain/A Comprehensive Survey of
State Health Privacy Statutes, Health Privacy Project, July 1999, (visited Nov. 28, 1999)
<http://www.healthprivacy.org/resources/statereports/keyfind.html> (describing the extent and
variation between states protections of health information).
129 See Public Law 104-191.  Full text available at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=104_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ191.104> (last visited 27-Nov-99).
Legislative information available at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d104:HR03103:|TOM:/bss/d104query.html|> (last visited 27-Nov-99).
130 See 42 USCA § 1320d-2 (1999); “Summary of Proposed Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information” available at <http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/admnsimp/pvcsumm.htm>
(last visited 27-Nov-99).
131 Pub. L. 104-191 TITLE II--PREVENTING HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE;
ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATION; MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM, Part C--AdministrativeSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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The law also set an August 1999 deadline for Congress to come up with privacy
restrictions to go along with the technical standards for electronic medical
records.
132  Congress missed its deadline, and the law requires as a result that
the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall impose such standards in its
stead by February 2000.
133  The Secretary’s draft regulations were put out for
public comment in November 1999.
134
                                                                                                                                                        
Simplification, SEC. 1172(c)(3) at <http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/pl104191.htm#1172> says: 3)
CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.-- "(A) IN GENERAL.--A standard may not be adopted under
this part unless-- "(i) in the case of a standard that has been developed, adopted, or modified by
a standard setting organization, the organization consulted with each of the organizations
described in subparagraph (B) in the course of such development, adoption, or modification; and
"(ii) in the case of any other standard, the Secretary, in complying with the requirements of
subsection (f), consulted with each of the organizations described in subparagraph (B) before
adopting the standard. "(B) ORGANIZATIONS DESCRIBED.--The organizations referred to in
subparagraph (A) are the following: "(i) The National Uniform Billing Committee. "(ii) The National
Uniform Claim Committee. "(iii) The Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange. "(iv) The
American Dental Association. There have been four sets of standards approved.  See
<http://erm.aspe.hhs.gov/ora_web/plsql/erm_rule.rule?user_id=&rule_id=14> I looked at the
Standards for Electronic Transactions and Code Sets and it appears that these fell under (3)(A)(i)
(in that it was the work product of an existing standard-setting organization).  A complex internal
review process was developed which included consultation with industry as well as a public
comment period.
132 See Pub. L. 104-191 § 264(c)(1).  “If legislation governing standards with respect to the
privacy of individually identifiable health information transmitted in connection with the
transactions described in section 1173(a) of the Social Security Act … is not enacted by the date
that is 36 months after the date of the enactment of this Act (Aug. 21, 1996), the Secretary of
Health and Human Services shall promulgate final regulations containing such standards not later
than the date that is 42 months after the date of the enactment of this Act.”  Contained in
annotations to 42 USCA § 1320d-2 (1999).
133 Id.
134 See  Notice of Proposed Rule Making for Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable
Health Information available at <http://www.hhs.gov/hottopics/healthinfo/index.html> (last visited
28-Nov-99, herinafter Proposed Rules).  See also 45 CFR Parts 160 Through 164, Standards for
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information; Proposed Rule, November 3, 1999.
(alternative format: Federal Register / Vol. 64, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 3, 1999 /
Proposed Rules,  pp. 59917-60065); Summary of Proposed Standards, n106 supra.
125 42 USC § 1320d-6.  “(a) Offense
A person who knowingly and in violation of this part--
(1) uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier;
(2) obtains individually identifiable health information relating to an individual; or
(3) discloses individually identifiable health information to another person,
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Penalties
A person described in subsection (a) of this section shall--
(1) be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both;
(2) if the offense is committed under false pretenses, be fined not more than $100,000,STANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
49 of 70 02/24/00 3:53 PM
The draft regulations entail substantive enhancements to privacy rights
combining the fiat of rule-and-sanction regulation
135 with a dash of strengthened
contract-like rights.
136  For example, health organizations may not release
medical records that are easily identifiable unless certain specific exceptions
apply.
137  Further, patients are given the right to inspect their own records.
138  No
private right of action is contemplated for violation of any of the rule’s
proscriptions.
139  Identifiable data may be released for virtually any otherwise-
lawful purpose with a patient’s consent, and the rule goes into great detail about
how that consent should be obtained, featuring a number of mandatory
disclosures and a requirement that the consent be revocable.
140
At least one health privacy watchdog group has gone on record as being
generally pleased with the regulations, noting that in several areas they protect
privacy as much as the discretion granted by Congress to HHS allowed.
141  Still,
read in light of the copyright analysis discussed above, they reflect the
institutional disparities guarding the respective interests at stake.  A “copyright”
                                                                                                                                                        
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both; and
(3) if the offense is committed with intent to sell, transfer, or use individually identifiable health
information for commercial advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm, be fined not more than
$250,000, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”  See also “Summary of Proposed
Standards,” n106 supra.  See also § 164.506(a) and § 164.510 et. seq. of Proposed Rules, n109
supra.  See also Latanya Sweeney, Weaving Technology and Policy Together to Maintain
Confidentiality, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 98, 100 (1997).  (Notes: Sweeny article not available
electronically, is this the correct article?).
135 See section II.A.
136 See section II.B.
137 See note 169, supra. A.2. Covered Information (visited Nov. 29 1998)
<http://www.hhs.gov/hottopics/healthinfo/pvc06.htm>("We propose to apply the standards in this
proposed regulation to individually identifiable health information that is or has been electronically
transmitted or maintained by a covered entity, including such information when it is in non-
electronic form (e.g., printed on paper) or discussed orally.")
138 See note 169, supra. Right of access for inspection or copying. (§ 164.514(a))
139 See note 169, supra. Rights of individuals (§§ 164.512 - 164.516)
140 See note 169, supra. (Uses and disclosures with individual authorization. (§ 164.508))
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regime of rights for privacy would entail an explicit statement of exclusive rights
given the patient, with a few specific carve-outs for the purposes of “fair use,”
which would be quite vague and difficult for fair users to rely upon.
142  Instead of
establishing “privacyright,” however, the regulations merely subject identifiable
medical data to “fair information practices”—the sort of protection identified by at
least one scholar as a consistent means of undermining a sold rights regime.
143
These practices are standards rather than rules, requiring that the covered
entities “not use or disclose more than the minimum amount of protected health
information necessary to accomplish the intended purpose.”
144  Under the rubric
of “scalability,” the HHS draft considers implementation of these rights to be
“flexible,” asking each covered entity to “assess its own needs and implement
privacy policies appropriate to its information practices and business
requirements.”
145  The carve-outs are, by comparison, quite explicit, allowing law
                                                   
142 While a regime of clear rule cabined by exceptions expressed as vague standards need not
always harm those seeking to invoke the exceptions, the case-by-case basis on which courts
decide fair use claims, and the ability of the rights holder to choose when and whether to bring an
action, make individual users of copyrighted material legitimately uncertain about the scope of the
privileges they enjoy.  See generally, William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine,
101 Harv. L. Rev. 1661 (1988).
143 See Regan at 178.
144 See note 169, supra (“Covered entities also would be permitted to use or disclose an
individual’s protected health information for specified public and public policy-related purposes,
including public health, research, health oversight, law enforcement, and use by coroners.
Covered entities would be permitted by this rule to use and disclose protected health information
when required to do so by other law, such as a mandatory reporting requirement under State law
or pursuant to a search warrant. See proposed § 164.510. Covered entities would be required by
this rule to disclose protected health information for only two purposes: to permit individuals to
inspect and copy protected health information about them (see proposed § 164.514) and for
enforcement of this rule (see proposed § 164.522(e)).”)
145 See U.S. Department Of Health & Human Services, Proposed Standards for Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information (visited Nov. 29, 1999)
<http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/admnsimp/pvcsumm.htm>; note 180, supra.  For a critique of distributed
emergence of fair information practices, see Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair
Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 497, 511 (1995) ("The pursuit of
targeted standards at a time of explosive growth in wide-scale information processing activity
makes the actual determination of rights, responsibilities, and practices in American societySTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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enforcement, medical research, and other government interests continued
access to patient records without consent, so long as certain procedural steps
are followed.
146  HHS may ultimately exact civil penalties for violation of its
privacy rules, and in some cases may refer privacy violations to the Department
of Justice for criminal prosecution.  However, its own proposed regulations treat
both of these actions as last resorts, preferring “informal resolution” on a case-
by-case basis to more formal and precedent setting procedures that could have a
deterrent effect.
147  As with my analysis of copyright, I do not here mean to
analyze whether these carve-outs are good public policy; rather, I wish to
underscore the levels of specificity and enforceability—and therefore “usability”—
at which the rights and exceptions are expressed, seen in light of the political
power of the interests behind each.
How much of a difference the proposed rules might make for privacy is
difficult to predict, especially when one considers the backdrop of enhanced
portability of electronic records that the HIPAA hastens.
148  As the November
                                                                                                                                                        
complex.  The varied standards for fair information practice offer overlapping, yet distinct,
treatment of personal information.  Only the combination of legal rules, industry norms, and
business practices can properly define the scope of standards for the treatment of personal
information in the private sector.")
146 See note 169, supra. (§ 164.510(b)-(n));  See generally, William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing
the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1661 (1988).
147 See <http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/adminsimp/nprm/pvc49.htm>.
148 Relationship to State laws at <http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/admnsimp/nprm/pvc47.htm>; Sec. Pub.
Law 104-191 Sec. 1178. Effect on State Law at
<http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/admnsimp/pl104191.htm#1178 264(c)(2)> at
<http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/pl104191.htm#264> PREEMPTION.--A regulation promulgated
under paragraph (1) shall not supercede a contrary provision of State law, if the provision of State
law imposes requirements, standards, or implementation specifications that are more stringent
than the requirements, standards, or implementation specifications imposed under the regulation.
See  text at http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/admnsimp/nprm/pvc47.htm
"Section 264 of HIPAA contains a related preemption provision. Section 264(c)(2) is, as
discussed above, an exception to the "general rule" that the federal standards and requirements
preempt contrary State law. Section 264(c)(2) provides, instead, that contrary State laws that
relate to the privacy of individually identifiable health information will not be preempted by theSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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draft would have it, there is no private right of action for violations of the
regulations.  Thus ongoing enforcement by government agencies and
prosecutors will be needed to guarantee respect of the new rights.  Further, how
genuine patients’ consent will prove to be—which, once granted, permits the data
free-for-all to continue—is also difficult to predict, although the regulations do
prohibit the conditioning of medical care on consent to data sharing.
149
There are other possible legal approaches to solving the medical privacy
problem in the era of promiscuous publication.  In one approach, Congress could
enable aggrieved citizens to bring class actions representing individuals whose
privacy rights have been violated, thereby discouraging misuse of medical
records.  Of course, with the records in custody of the defendant and the
information within possibly available from other sources, those whose privacy
has been violated often have no way of knowing of the fact of the violation—
much less the source.  Junk mail from a vitamin supplements company may be
random or may be targeted based on records drawn from cancer sufferers.  A
denial of employment might be based on a bad interview or on knowledge that
the applicant is HIV-positive.  Furthermore, a class action regime is essentially
reactive rather than preventive—at least for the current round of plaintiffs.  Money
damages may be better than nothing, and they might help reduce future privacy
violations, but the patient might well prefer that the violation never happened to
                                                                                                                                                        
federal requirements, if they are "more stringent" than those requirements. This policy, under
which the federal privacy protections act as a floor, but not a ceiling on, privacy protections, is
consistent with the Secretary's Recommendations."
149 64 FR 59918, Vol. 64, No. 212, Proposed Rules, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, (HHS) Section 164.506(a) Use and Disclosure for Treatment, Payment, and Health
Care Operations. “We also propose to prohibit covered entities from seeking individualSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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begin with.  Finally, potential industry defendants would likely bitterly oppose
such a system because it introduces an element of uncertainty into their choices
of what to do with the medical information they ward.
A second approach could be to create a general privacy right with respect to
medical records along with a safe harbor provision for those who wish to use
medical data.  A safe harbor provision generally sets up a set of standards with
which an entity can comply in order to ensure freedom from legal liability.  It
functions as an incentive to behave responsibly.
150  Use of safe harbors in the
information privacy context has recently become an issue in the United States in
response to the European Union’s directive on information privacy.
151  Since the
                                                                                                                                                        
authorization for uses and disclosures for treatment, payment and health care operations unless
required by State or other applicable law.”
150 Safe harbors are already used by the SEC in the context of corporate disclosures and by the
EPA in the context of environmental preservation; see Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, H.R. 1058; “Announcement of Final Safe Harbor Policy” EPA (last visited 2/19/2000) at
<http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-SPECIES/1999/June/Day-17/e15256.htm>.
151 See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data (1995).  See also, Presidents Information Infrastructure Task Force,
“Options for Promoting Privacy on the National Information Infrastructure” (April 1997) (last visited
2/19/2000) at <http://www.iitf.nist.gov/ipc/privacy.htm#N_9_> (“Under the EU Directive, personal
data must be collected for specified and legitimate purposes and "not processed in a way
incompatible with those purposes." Data must be adequate, relevant, accurate, current, not
excessive, and must not be kept in identifying form for any longer than necessary. Personal data
may be processed only if the data subject has consented "unambiguously" or if the processing
falls within an exception, some of which include contract, legal obligation, or where a data
subject's "fundamental rights and freedoms" in the personal information do not outweigh the
legitimate interests of the data gatherer and where processing is necessary to pursue these
interests. Under the EU Directive, member states must provide judicial remedies for any breach
of the rights guaranteed, and adopt enforcement mechanisms, including sanctions for
infringements of the privacy laws enacted in conformance with the Directive. The EU Directive
requires member states to establish supervisory authorities to monitor the application of national
law adopted pursuant to the EU Directive. The supervisory authorities are required to have
investigatory authority, effective powers of intervention, and the power to engage in legal
proceedings or to bring violations to the attention of judicial authorities. Article 25(2) of the EU
Directive requires member states to ensure that personal data is transferred only to third
countries with "adequate" privacy protection. Adequacy is to be determined on a case by case
basis in light of all the circumstances surrounding a particular data transfer. The U.S. and EU are
discussing how the EU Directive might affect transatlantic data flow, but these discussions are in
early stages. Nevertheless, no discussion of online privacy protection can be complete withoutSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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EU began requiring certain privacy guarantees for participation in information
exchange, the United States government has been working to negotiate a safe
harbor provision that would help U.S. entities both know what they needed to do
to comply as well as avoid liability.
152  Certain privacy advocates have lauded this
approach.
153  This is a promising approach, but still requires an enforcement
mechanism that might fall short.
The elephants of the music industry found it easy to bend law to their
interests, but still unfulfilling because it is a difficult tool to employ against the
individual gnats that would flout it.  Privacy advocates may face roughly the
inverse problem: they will find law more difficult to bend to their interests, since
they face more organized and powerful opposition to the creation of clear,
substantive rights.  Moreover, while the elephants who wish to consume and
share data in the medical privacy context may be more responsive to the prod of
legal enforcement than their individual counterpart consumers in copyright, it may
be harder for the individuals who are sources of medical data to engage the
corresponding mechanisms of enforcement.  Even the HHS regulations—drafted
by policymakers quite sympathetic to privacy interests—couple formal
enforcement teeth with paeans to “flexibility” for those charged with guarding
privacy and a desire for “informal resolution” above rule and sanction.
                                                                                                                                                        
appropriate consideration of the EU Directive and its implications for international trade in the
Information Age.”)
152 See U.S. Department of Government, “Draft International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles”
(November 15, 1999) (last visited 2/19/2000) at
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C. Solution 2.0: Technological self-help through trusted systems
A patient’s record and a musician’s record may appear quite different to the
casual observer, but as we have seen, both boil down to data susceptible to an
Era of Promiscuous Publication, harming the interests of their respective
owners.
154
As the music industry is discovering—enough so that its former horror over
the Internet is giving way to an embrace—it can seek to protect against
technology’s perceived excesses by having the desired limits themselves be of
technological character, embedded in the very scheme thought to be causing the
potential for abuse.
Consider three of the interrelated new rights proposed in the HHS draft
regulations: a patient’s right to inspect his or her information in a medical
database, a patient’s right to give consent before that information is transferred
for many purposes, and a patient’s right to receive an accounting of instances in
which information has been disclosed.
155
As we have seen, while the original Act’s administrative simplification
provisions are intended to bring about easier information sharing among holders
of medical data through quite thoroughly elaborated technical standards—which
                                                                                                                                                        
153 See Phil Agre, “EU/US Privacy Safe Harbor”, Red Rock Eater News Service, (1998) (last
visited 2/19/2000) at <http://www.tao.ca/wind/rre/0572.html>.
154 See note 13, supra.  (David Post)
155 See §§ 164.514(a) and 164.515 of Proposed Rules, n109 supra; Summary of Proposed
Standards n.106 supra; Summary and purpose of the proposed rule of Proposed Rules, n.109
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makes an invasion of privacy easier
156—the accompanying privacy rights
implementations float at a much higher level of abstraction, variable from one
entity to the next in the name of “flexibility.”
For example, a hospital with a highly efficient electronic records scheme
could nonetheless insist on fulfilling the patient’s right to inspect data or gain an
accounting of its redistribution by requiring the filling out of a paper form,
performing a less-than-instantaneous manual search, and then releasing
photocopied sheets in fulfillment of the request.
157  Indeed, this is just how the
“Medical Information Bureau” clearinghouse—a Massachusetts company that
gathers and redistributes health data on fifteen million Americans for insurance
assessment purposes—currently allows patients to review the records
accumulated on them.
158  After the request is fulfilled, a new cycle of paperwork
would presumably be necessary to see updates to one’s data.
                                                   
156 “Presumably, authorized users of health information would possess a patient identification
number that would grant them access to all or part of the electronic record.  The unique identifier
would permit entry to many potential data sources held by government agencies, heath plans,
health data organizations, and other information holders.  If follows that physicians, nurses,
pharmacists, lab technicians, administrators, payors, regulators, and many others could retrieve a
comprehensive health record from any geographic area linked to the health data network.
Patients would not consent to access other than in the most general way, and could not
realistically govern the manner in which data were utilized.”  Lawrence O. Gostin, Health
Information Privacy, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 451, 485.
157 If the response rates for FOIA are any indicator--and, to be sure, a healthcare institution is not
a government agency--weeks-long turnaround times even for electronic records would not be
unsurprising.  See Don J. Benedictis, LOGJAM BREAKUP: Court Ruling Could Speed Freedom
of Information Requests, 75 A.B.A.J. 28, (September, 1989); Christopher Dorobek, Agencies Lag
in E-FOIA efforts, GOVERNMENT COMPUTER NEWS, January 12, 1998, at 1.
158 MIB home page (visited Nov. 28, 1999) <http://www.mib.com/> (visited Nov 28, 1999)
<http://www.mib.com/consumer/about_general.html> (About MIB) The MIB website states that it
complies with requests for disclosures within 30 days.   Bruce L. Watson, Disclosure of
Computerized Health Care Information: Provider Privacy Rights Under Supply Side Competition,
7 Am. J. L. and Med. 265, (1981) , Sandra Byrd Petersen, Your Life as an Open Book: Has
Technology Rendered Personal Privacy Virtually Obsolete?, 48 Fed. Comm. L.J. 163 (1995)
(“An insurance company can combine this information with medical records that can be obtained
from the Medical Information Bureau (MIB) which has data on 15 million people. The result is a
very complete picture of a person's lifestyle, regardless of whether or not the information isSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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Similarly, consent for redistribution of data might be obtained through a
stylized exchange of paper at the initiation of the relationship between a patient
and an entity covered by the regulations.  While the regulations insist upon a
thorough disclosure to the patient of the intended uses of information being
collected or generated, including an explicit statement of intention to sell or barter
the information,
159 it appears that a blanket authorization can be obtained once
and never revisited unless the patient seeks to do so, presumably through
another flurry of paperwork.  While this may not satisfy privacy advocates,
160 any
stronger rendering of consent—for example, requiring assent for each non-
medically-necessary release of identifiable patient data—raises transaction costs
on the releaser that do not satisfy others.
161
Finally, whatever the legal rules about privacy, an untrusted (in the technical
sense) implementation of whatever information-sharing standards emerge from
                                                                                                                                                        
accurate. Furthermore, although the information collected concerns some of the most intimate
details of personal life, individuals may be unaware of its existence and, therefore, unable to
correct any misinformation contained in these records”).
159 See § 164.512 of Proposed Rules, n109 supra, “we would require covered plans or providers
to develop and document policies and procedures relating to use, disclosure, and access to
protected health information.”; § 164.520 of Proposed Rules, n109 supra.
160 See e.g., Some Groups Cool to New Privacy Rules, Insurance, Rights
Leaders Complain, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 30, 1999 ("'We question why it takes over
600 pages to provide medical records confidentiality protection when it took our Founding Fathers
only one page to provide Americans with all their basic rights,' said Mary Nell Lehnhard, senior
vice president at the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association." And, "The police should not be
able to say to a hospital: 'Give us Mr. Smith's medical charts because we think something's fishy,'
said ACLU legislative consultant Ronald Weich. 'One of the most basic principles of American
justice is that police must obtain a warrant from a judge before searching through your property.
Medical records should be treated no differently.'"); Alissa J. Rubin, Proposal on Privacy in
Reverse, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999 ("'I had high hopes for this legislation when they started
holding hearings on it last year,' said Denise Nagel, a physician and executive director of the
National Coalition for Patient Rights, which is based in Lexington, Mass. 'So I was really surprised
they came out pre-empting state law. ... States are just getting around to writing medical
confidentiality law. ... You could drive a Mack truck through the holes in the bill.'")
161 See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information, 76
Tex. L. Rev. 1, (November 1997) at 9 (arguing that Posner's argument that "if the lists are
generally worth more to the purchasers than being shielded from possible unwanted solicitation isSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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the Act could enable widespread information piracy, of just the sort that even the
music industry—with all its sophistication, statutory rights backing, and political
power—feared in the absence of technical protection schemes.  It is simply too
easy for someone near a health information system to be able to abuse its
contents, even if she is not free to do so.  This may be clearer if we again frame
the current Act and corresponding privacy regulations through the lens of
copyright enforcement: it is as if Congress had actively promoted—nay,
mandated—the development and use of the highly efficient and non-rights-
architectured MP3 compression standards for digital music, leaving the
formulation of protection from any abuse to a government agency which would
prescribe general regulations lacking any private right of action.
Now imagine for a moment the patient control possible for these same three
rights in a world where privacy advocates have succeeded in creating a trusted
system that provides the patient with as much lopsided control over her medical
records as the music industry’s privication architecture seeks to provide for its
intellectual property.  Built on an ability to discriminate on the basis of consumer
characteristics and on nuance on the provision of desired information to
consumers with different kinds of interests in the data, the architecture could
effect control not readily possible—not even administratively so—without it:
Suppose a patient could “log in” at any time to the databank of her one-stop
HMO.
162  She could do so through her own personal computer over a secure
                                                                                                                                                        
worht to the susscribers, we should assign the property right to the magazine; and the law does
this" is preposterous, and that getting consent is worth the transaction costs).
162 See, e.g., Lawrence Gostin, THE DATABASES, Health Care Information and the Protection of
Personal Privacy: Ethical and Legal Considerations, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, Oct. 15 1997,STANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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connection on the Internet, or through a terminal provided for this purpose at a
library or health care provider.  With a few mouse clicks she could view her own
records as readily as a physician seeking access to them through similar
computer-mediated means.  She could view an audit log revealing who has seen
her records and when, perhaps setting permissions as to whom among various
categories of potential viewers—or even whom among specific people—is
authorized to look at which pieces of information.  She might, for example, want
to exclude her notes from psychotherapy from easy access by anyone but her
therapist, even if her therapist and primary care physician are employed by the
same institution.  She might want to allow those to whom she gives permission a
chance to see the data but not save it—so an outside physician could look at her
records but not print them or save a copy into another databank.  The emergency
room attending physician may be able to view an incoming patient’s records for
the duration of her visit to the emergency room, and lose access thereafter.  This
makes it possible for the record holder meaningfully to change her mind about
certain disclosures to which she had previously agreed: she might allow baby
products companies to know that she was recently in the clinic for an ultrasound
related to a pregnancy so that they could identify her for the purposes of sending
her coupons, but then revoke permission to include her name on targeted mailing
                                                                                                                                                        
at 683-690 (describing a near-future medical information infrastructure in which patients, doctors,
and health care organizations will be able to access conveniently patient information from
centralized databases); Heather Green & Linda Himelstein, A Cyber Revolt in Health Care
BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 19, 1998, at 154 (“Longer term, the hope is the Web will go far beyond
serving up medical data and will finally link together physicians, patients, and insurers like a
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lists should something go wrong with the pregnancy.
163  She might choose to
allow a local pharmacy to view a list of her recent prescriptions at no charge, for
the purpose of offering her a better pricing package, while charging an over-the-
counter drug company $100 to see a record of her vaccinations, pre-paid.  She
might even ask that her spouse be permitted to make such rights determinations
in her absence, or that in no case will her rights be more expansive than the list
recommended (and electronically made available) by a privacy watchdog
group.
164
Indeed, she might only agree to the use of her medical data for marketing
purposes so long as there is a division between those who conceive of a
promotional mailing (and know its criteria) and those who actually view the
mailing labels and affix them to the promotional materials for mailing.
165  An
extreme implementation of the system would even allow the patient simply to
                                                   
163 See William J. Fenrich, Common Law Protection of Individuals’ Rights in Personal Information,
65 Fordham L. Rev. 951, 953-954 (1996) (describing two years during which a woman was
“bombarded” with baby-product samples, calls from baby photographers, and baby birthday
wishes accompanying solitications, despite her miscarriage and subsequent attempts to be
removed from marketing lists);  See id. at 954 n. 25 (describing hospital’s sale of woman’s
unlisted address to marketers after she delivered her baby there).
164 Such a proxy would be similar to PICS, the Platform for Internet Content Selection, by which
Internet users can ask to have web sites screened out on the basis of judgments by “raters”
whom they trust to substitute judgment.  PICS home page, (visited Nov. 29, 1999)
<http://www.w3.org/PICS/> (“The PICSTM specification enables labels (metadata) to be
associated with Internet content. It was originally designed to help parents and teachers control
what children access on the Internet, but it also facilitates other uses for labels, including code
signing and privacy. The PICS platform is one on which other rating services and filtering
software have been built.”).
165 The third party would, in turn, have no knowledge of the criteria used to select the names on
the labels printed.  This compartmentalization of knowledge was not itself sufficient for a
consumer reporting agency with a targeted marketing division to avoid the proscriptions regarding
treatment of certain kinds of personal information under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. See Trans
Union v. FTC, 81 F.3d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  But it suggests one means by which less
personal information can be divulged short of an outright ban on targeted marketing.STANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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delete her records, or extract them from the system and keep them in her
personal custody.
166
While this hypothetical might seem appealing to some privacy advocates, it
represents a balancing of interests that ignores most interests of the consumers
of medical data—politically implausible at least, and perhaps even simply bad
policy.  It permits the possibility that Scott McNealy could frighten a wave of
patients into deleting all their medical data en masse,
167 or that a particularly
compelling telemarketer could flimflam patients into accessing and retransmitting
all their sensitive medical information.
168   However, no matter how unappealing,
these potentialities attest to the true range of power of trusted systems
architectures.
I do not here seek to build a case for one or another particular allocation of
rights and constraints with regard to medical records.  Rather, I wish to
emphasize that a well-designed trusted system of rights to medical data could be
both powerful and flexible.  The actual policy choices underlying what rights
                                                   
166 Cf. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for
Individual Rights?, 44 Fed. Com. L.J. 195, 240 (1992) (“Information networks may be structured
to provide only the minimal amount of personal information necessary to accomplish a particular
task and to delete personal information as soon as it is no longer needed.”)
167 See note 71, supra.  (Edward Baig)
168 See Susan Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in the Age of the
Internet, 34 San Diego L. Rev. 1153, 1161 (In 1996, LEXIS-NEXIS introduced P-TRAK, which
provides up to three adresses, as well as aliases, maiden names, and birthdates for over 300
million people, including Social Security numbers (at the time of its introduction).  There was
considerable public uproar and discussion in the media and on Internet discussion groups.);
Laurie J. Flynn, Lexis-Nexis Flap Prompts Push for Privacy Rights, N.Y. TIMES CYBERTIMES (Oct.
13, 1996) (visited Nov. 29, 1999); Bruce Mohl, Trading Privacy for Convenience, BOSTON GLOBE,
November 1, 1995, at 19 (discussing the pros and cons of Star Market cards which give
discounts but also track shopping habits to help target advertising).
<http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/1013nexis.html>; Regan, at 49 (discussing the
difficulties of obtaining useful polling data about people’s privacy preferences); Karen McNally
Bensing, Con Artists Scam Victims Over the Phone, PLAIN DEALER at 2J, Jan. 4, 1998 (describing
prevalence of scams and use of medical data by scammers to better identify prey).STANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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architecture to build—what powers to grant to the patient and what exceptions to
insist upon in a trusted system containing her data—are as difficult as any other
policy choices involving rights (or property) allocation.  The process by which
HHS would determine how much “trust” to include in its interoperable standards,
and whom to assign each of the sticks within a bundle of constraints, would itself
be political.  Privacy advocates would have to strategize to focus on just which
elements of medical privacy were most important, and which could be left open
within a negotiation at which other interests—medical research, government,
direct marketing—are also well represented at the table.
Indeed, to the extent that privacy is simply a dignity interest, rather than a
more readily calculable remunerative interest like protection of copyright, it is all
the harder for those who embrace it properly to calibrate pressure to vindicate
the interest to its perceived degree of importance, whether arguing for overall
legal protection or weighing whether to pursue an individual action.  Thus, if
government is stepping in to subsidize and ultimately mandate a system for
interoperable medical records, one may wonder why it should be any easier for
patients to see their preferences reflected in that system as “trust” when their
privacy has not been incorporated into traditional federal privacy frameworks to
begin with.  Isn’t the public choice problem the same whether one is trying to
convince Congress to mandate strong privacy rights as legal rules or within
software code?  I reflect on this issue in section V and argue that code helps
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V. Beyond the publisher: Privication to satisfy both producers
and consumers of data
Privacy advocates will only be able to benefit from the power and flexibility of
a well-designed trusted system if it is politically and economically possible to
implement one.  A trusted system to protect music is emerging from market
actors; apparently a handful of record companies—and technology companies—
can overcome a collective action problem and invest in an interoperable
protection scheme of benefit to all.  There is no such phenomenon yet taking
place for medical records; the collective action problem among millions of
patients may make market-based development of a comprehensive medical
trusted system quite difficult, just as it has been difficult for the market actors of
hospitals, HMOs, and insurance companies to generate even an untrusted
interoperable medical records system clearly of benefit to all.
Rather than being able to generate protection themselves, then, those who
wish to protect medical privacy will be nearly as dependent on government
intervention as they would be if they sought a legal rights-based solution.  Yet
their energy may still be better spent on the creation of a trusted system for
medical records than on a new rule-and-sanction regime, because it will benefit
them more than law and, done well, threaten competing interests less.  The
analysis of privication architectures in Part III suggests that it may yet be
politically feasible, even desirable, for all those with a stake in rights to medical
records—privacy advocates, medical researchers, and doctors alike—to create a
trusted system that seeks to embed rights satisfactory to most interests.STANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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First, so long as permissible and impermissible information practices can be
defined in a way satisfactory to most interests—to be sure, a daunting
challenge—consumers of medical data might well prefer an architecture where it
is, as a technical matter, difficult to stray from authorized uses.  The
implementation of the trusted system could then be a safe harbor defense
against a class action suit, agency enforcement proceeding, or other litigation-
dependent remedy.
Second, privication architectures might help meet the daunting challenge of
defining fair information practices, since the increased granularity of rights
afforded by a technological system makes room for entirely new rights
constructs.  The expression of rights through a trusted system may allow for
“baby-splitting” among interests that is not feasible in more traditional regimes.
For example, in place of the stalemate over who should “own” a record, a well-
defined self-enforcing rights architecture could allow information sharing without
having to ultimately resolve matters in as coarse a way as “owner” or “non-
owner.”  A patient might wish the right to delete her record, while medical
researchers would object to the non-random loss of possibly important medical
data.  The system could enable deletion for “most intents and purposes”; one
could imagine a deleted record no longer appearing on a hospital computer
display, and no longer being available for marketing purposes, while still being
included in scans of records by medical researchers.  Just as a musical trusted
system might distinguish between students and businesspeople—to enable price
discrimination by the publisher—a medical trusted system might distinguishSTANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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among identities of those seeking to use the system, and among the purposes
for which the access is sought.  Indeed, the easy unbundling of songs from an
album in the music context could become the unbundling of some data elements
from others in patient records.  A patient could release maternity information for
marketing purposes while withholding HIV status; the government could still
access the entire record (with process) for subpoena purposes if the entire
record were deemed relevant, but otherwise it too, could get only the information
needed for a particular purpose, such as payment information for fraud reduction
efforts.  For audit rights, a patient might be able to see everything in her record
except that which is explicitly marked to be held back by an authorized doctor.
Then, at least, she would have a sense of what she did not know and why, and
her access to some parts of her record would not be held hostage to other parts
deemed, for some important reason, off-limits even to her.  All this could be done
with a minimum of administrative burden on the database custodians.
The granularity of rights available within trusted systems also suggests that
we need not choose between creating horizontally-integrated records (all records
across a given institution) and vertically-integrated ones (all records pertaining to
a given individual, wherever those records may be).  Granting a patient seamless
access to her records among all covered institutions means that getting a second
opinion from an outside doctor—or transferring to another health care provider
entirely—can be accomplished without the barriers of paperwork and delay
endemic to patient access to current automated systems such as the MIB.
169
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This can promote competition without depriving institutions of the horizontal
access to records deemed necessary to utilization review or other purposes.
Allowing granular “dynamic consent” for medical data could see patients
electing to accept offers of all kinds for releasing their information, creating
market efficiencies for the sale of vertically-integrated patient information where
before there was primarily only the release of horizontally-integrated data by
health care institutions.  The system might even be constructed to allow patients
to set preferences for access to some of their personal data, but discourage the
creation of a market by denying them the ability to sell other data.  Patients could
thus be restricted from handing over highly sensitive information for a pittance
without realizing the implications of the transfer, while still able to control other
information.  As various databases begin to converge—imagine the use a doctor
could make of data on everything from one’s genome to one’s supermarket
purchases, already recorded in many instances, to help design a healthy diet or
correlate diet with a given disorder—an ability to efficiently set sophisticated
gates around data elements could be critical.  At the very least, a granular trusted
system allows for those on the margins who care dearly about personal privacy
to limit circulation of records, without requiring a similar default policy that binds
all other patients.
Third, privacy advocates may learn from the music industry’s structure rather
than its technology: the use of aggregation of preferences may be applied to the
problem of ill-informed (or simply disinterested) patients being asked to specify a
battery of preferences about the disposition of their sensitive medical data.STANFORD LAW REVIEW DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR REDISTRIBUTION – ZITTRAIN
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ASCAP and RIAA are instruments of aggregation of preferences; to clear rights
to a covered song one consults with ASCAP without having to reach the original
author or performer.  One could imagine an initial form presented to an incoming
patient with some notice of the availability of a system through which to view
records and exercise certain rights with respect to them.  The form could ask a
few coarse, basic questions, the answers to which would help fill in the initial
patient-set constraints of the elaborated trusted system; it could also offer
descriptions of three or four organizations whose preferences the patient could
initially adopt as her own.  Thus one could check a box, say, for the American
Medical Association, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, or the AARP—
importing preferences in one step that could be revisited at the patient’s leisure
later.
170
Finally, trusted systems’ Newtonian inertia of rights enforcement will help
privacy interests over the long term given their weak political representation and
power—once the system is in place, government cooperation is not nearly as
important as it might be to traditional rights enforcement.  The recent expansive
history of federal copyright protection may well cause us to underappreciate this
point, since the music industry has enjoyed an ongoing application of
government protection and pressure to vindicate its rights before beginning to
turn to trusted systems.  Federal privacy protection, on the other hand, has more
resembled the booth at the county fair where one attempts to swing a hammer so
hard as to ring a bell overhead: it happens rarely, and the resonance fades not
long after the deed is done.  It does happen from time to time, however, and if
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the pressure that brought about Federal privacy protection for video rental and
drivers license records can be brought to bear for medical records in one
concentrated swoop as the Department of Health and Human Services maps out
privacy protection regimes through its rulemaking, the trusted system might be
established and then resonate much longer thanks to its momentum.
171  Indeed,
Congress might find it politically more difficult to undermine a privacy regime—to
affirmatively strip privacy rights accorded by HHS—than to simply fail to pass
legislation establishing the rights in the first instance.  The physics of trusted
systems are thus well suited to a Congress that only rarely allows a bite of
privacy’s legislative apple.
In a political environment marked by persistent stalemate, the conception of a
privication architecture for medical records could encourage new compromise
among formerly competing interests, and ultimately more privacy protection with
a minimum of social cost.
VI.   Conclusion
No practical combination of law and technology will be a panacea for the
deep problem of control over information.  Pinpointing the rights to be protected
and the exceptions to apply is an ongoing exercise in civic discourse.  The ability
to elaborate those rights in detailed, self-executing ways could remove some
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“give” in a system that also counts on norm and dynamic interpretation—respect
for law, and for its substantive aims by those subject to it, and respect for the
distinct circumstances of each case by courts enforcing it—to arrive at a just
status quo.
172  In the case of privacy, only some of the matters of current
pressing concern—for example, the routine use of personal information for
marketing, employment, or insurance purposes—are satisfied by a trusted
privication regime.  Embarrassing personal details can be publicized as soon as
an indiscreet (if authorized) viewer of personal data chooses to gossip, no matter
how difficult it is for viewer to print the data or regain access to it later.  However,
despite its shortcomings, a trusted privication architecture for medical data offers
a kind and degree of protection that law alone cannot easily emulate.
The Era of Promiscuous Publication is upon us, and for publishers of
intellectual property the quite different Era of Trusted Privication is about to enter
on its heels.  A rare and fleeting chance for the latter era to come about for
medical privacy in the United States is now within grasp.  A system is already
under construction specifically to leverage the fruits of the information age—quick
processors, immense data storage, ubiquitous networks—into a drastic lowering
of the costs of sharing personal medical data.  The question is how much trust it
will have—and who will be thought of as its “customers.”
173  The government has
already taken on the ambitious task of shaping a comprehensive set of standards
                                                                                                                                                        
since the “elephant” consumers of medical data may count among them fewer rogues than the
individual “gnats” who consume intellectual property.
172 Cf. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules And Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation In Criminal
Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984) (defining acoustic separation as the intentional separation
judges and legislators make between the law as stated and the law as applied in specific cases).
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for medical records interchange,
174 and private efforts are also under way to
develop such systems.
175
If the moment is not grasped now to develop and standardize privication
architectures, the untrusted system for medical records now under development
will have a momentum all its own.  As the power of technology is harnessed to
move us from a Gutenberg status quo of personal information sharing towards a
more promiscuous one, we must consider means to impose agreed-upon limits
that are grounded in that technology.
                                                   
174 See note 169, supra (Public Law, 1996 Act).
175 See Patient-Centered Access to Secure Systems Online (PCASSO), Provider’s User Guide,
1999 (visited Nov. 28, 1999) <http://medicine.ucsd.edu/pcasso/userguide.html> (offering secure
viewing of confidential medical records on the Internet); Healtheon (visited Nov. 28, 1999)
<http://www.healtheon.com/tech/index.html> (offering secure health care on the Internet);  Stefik,
The Internet Edge, 208. This particular “patient-centered” system builds in both power and limit to
patient access: the patient can view audit trails, but a physician’s access cannot be limited by the
patient, and the doctor may selectively screen substantive data from the patient’s view.  The
patient cannot delete or, it appears, copy any records in the system.